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INTRODUCTION 
This Article is about the changing role of the community 
foundation in conducting philanthropy in the United States. 
Community foundations are an important part of the U.S. 
philanthropic infrastructure. The nation’s 789 community founda-
tions hold roughly $82 billion in assets1 and account for over 
$7.68 billion of charitable grants.2 Many community foundations 
are the backbone of the social fabric in their communities, sup-
porting basic human needs, health care, housing, K-12 education, 
civic engagement, and the arts.3 Yet community foundations face 
new challenges to their niche and mission. 
Historically, the purpose of a community foundation was to 
provide place-based philanthropy. Community foundations would 
raise money from local leaders and spend money for the benefit of 
the community served. Communities could be urban, rural, and 
even regional, but the main idea was to provide philanthropic 
support for identifiable communities under the guidance of com-
munity leaders—a bit like philanthropic banks for regional inter-
ests.4 Today, however, the root idea that community foundations 
 
 1. Foundation Stats, FOUND. CTR., http://data.foundationcenter.org/#/foundations 
/all/nationwide/total/list/2014, (last updated Oct. 2014). 
 2. IND. UNIV. LILLY FAMILY SCH. OF PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 2017: THE ANNUAL 
REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2016, at 114 (2017). 
 3. See generally Key Facts on Community Foundations, FOUND. CTR. (Aug. 2012), 
http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/keyfacts_comm2012.pdf. 
 4. A sample of community foundations captures the diversity: the New York 
Community Trust, the Rhode Island Foundation, the Oregon Community Foundation, the 
Central Indiana Community Foundation, the Baltimore Community Foundation, the Okla-
homa City Community Foundation, the Foundation for the Carolinas, the Communities 
Foundation of Texas, and the largest, the Silicon Valley Community Foundation. The list 
goes on. 
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serve local needs is under threat. The community foundation is at 
risk of becoming more like a national bank, serving metaphysical 
communities and issues rather than people. 
The main challenge to the community foundation identity is 
due to the enormous success of national charities that sponsor do-
nor-advised funds (DAFs). Examples include organizations like 
the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, Schwab Charitable, and the 
Vanguard Charitable Endowment, to name three of the largest. 
These charities have catapulted into the ranks of the nation’s big-
gest charitable fundraisers through the mass-marketing of DAFs.5 
With a DAF, a donor makes a charitable contribution to the spon-
soring charity (e.g., Fidelity Charitable), gets a tax deduction, and 
then advises the sponsor on where to distribute the fund assets 
over time. 
The DAF was once the province of community foundations 
and relatively obscure. Community foundations developed the 
DAF as a fundraising tool that appealed to donors who wanted 
to remain involved in advising how their donated funds should 
be spent.6 After making a typically large gift a donor could con-
sult with community foundation staff about how best to direct 
funds for the benefit of the community served. The model was 
consultative, between donor and institution, and mission fo-
cused—grounded by the place-based exempt purpose of the 
community foundation. 
Yet today, DAFs are dominated by large, national organiza-
tions, not community foundations. In 2014, for the first time, as-
sets held by Fidelity, Schwab, and Vanguard DAFs exceeded the 
 
 5. In 2016, the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund became the largest charity in the Unit-
ed States in terms of contributions received, beating the United Way for the first time. The 
Schwab Charitable Fund was fourth, the Vanguard Charitable Endowment Program was 
tenth. See Peter Olsen-Phillips & Brian O’Leary, How Much America’s Biggest Charities Raise: 
27 Years of Data, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.philanthropy.com 
/interactives/philanthropy-400#id=table_2016 (listing the top 400 charities, measured by 
amount of contributions received). 
 6. The New York Community Trust is credited as creating the first donor-advised 
fund in the 1930s. See Eleanor W. Sacks, The Growing Importance of Community Foundations, 
IND. UNIV. LILLY FAMILY SCHOOL OF PHILANTHROPY 1, 8 (2014), https://philanthropy.iupui 
.edu/files/file/the_growing_importance_of_community_foundations-final_reduce_file_ 
size_2.pdf; see also Lila Corwin Berman, Donor Advised Funds in Historical Perspective, B.C. F. 
ON PHILANTHROPY & THE PUB. GOOD 5, 13–14 (2015), https://www.bc.edu/content/dam 
/files/schools/law/pdf/academics/forum_philanthropy/02_Berman.pdf. 
1.COLINVAUX_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/18  10:35 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
4 
asset value of the DAFs held by the top 274 community founda-
tions.7 The result is not just that national DAF sponsors dwarf 
community foundation DAFs in fundraising, but more important-
ly, the mass-market success of the DAF affects indelibly the nature 
of the DAF and in turn the place-based giving culture that histori-
cally prevailed in community foundations. 
Community foundations exist to serve a particular geographic 
area or region and are staffed by people who are connected to 
their communities. Traditionally, DAFs fit within this model. 
DAFs at national sponsoring organizations, however, have no 
connection to place or community but serve as a pass-thru for do-
nors whose advice is simply to designate a 501(c)(3) organization, 
based anywhere in the United States, with no meaningful consul-
tative role by the sponsoring charity. Because national fund spon-
soring organizations now broadly set the standard for donor-
advised funds, community foundations are becoming, willingly or 
not, subject to that standard. As a result, community foundations 
increasingly will cater to donor expectations of a national scope 
for charitable distributions, and a passive, individual-based model 
of advised giving, running counter to the traditional role of the 
community foundation. 
Relatedly, the dominance of the national fund organizations 
impacts the regulation of community foundations. Because na-
tionally sponsored DAFs have been controversial (and success-
ful),8 the DAF has risen to the forefront of policy debates about 
philanthropy.9 Community foundations have thus become caught 
 
 7. IND. UNIV. LILLY FAMILY SCH. OF PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 2016: THE ANNUAL 
REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2015, at 90 (2016) (citing a survey by CF Insights, 
which surveyed the 274 community foundations that represent ninety percent of total 
community foundation asset value). 
 8. Since Fidelity Charitable obtained charitable status in 1991, legal and policy 
questions persist. See infra notes 71–83 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Alan M. Cantor, Donor-Advised Funds and the Shifting Charitable Landscape: Why 
Congress Must Respond, B.C. F. ON PHILANTHROPY & THE PUB. GOOD 131, 134 (2015), http:// 
www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/law/pdf/academics/forum_philanthropy/08_Can 
tor.pdf; Lewis B. Cullman & Ray Madoff, The Undermining of American Charity, N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS (July 14, 2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/07/14/the-undermining 
-of-american-charity/; Alex Daniels & Drew Lindsay, Donor-Advised Funds Reshape the Phi-
lanthropy Landscape, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.philanthropy 
.com/article/Donor-Advised-Funds-Reshape/238188; The Rise of the Donor Advised Fund: 
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up in a legal and policy debate directed primarily at national, 
commercially affiliated organizations.10 As a result, not only may 
community foundations become subject to rules and regulations 
devised for other kinds of charities, but community foundations 
(as DAF sponsors) increasingly may be misunderstood by donors 
and policymakers and gradually lose their core identity. 
The time therefore is ripe for an assessment of the community 
foundation’s role in philanthropy.11 This Article takes as a baseline 
approach that the appropriate role for the community foundation 
is to serve discrete geographic communities. Without that focus, 
there is little reason to distinguish community foundations from 
other fundraising organizations, and community foundations 
then, at a minimum, should be subject to any additional rules im-
posed on national donor-advised fund sponsors.12 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I of the Article pro-
vides a historical overview of the tax-exempt status of community 
foundations, from inception to the present day. Part II shows how 
the settled wisdom on the tax status of community foundations 
has been upset by the rise of the nationally sponsored donor-
advised fund, the extent to which community foundations are dif-
ferent from national donor-advised fund sponsors, and whether it 
would be beneficial to define the community foundation for tax 
 
Should Congress Respond?, B.C. L. SCH. MAG. (Oct. 26, 2015), http://lawdigitalcommons 
.bc.edu/philanthropy-forum/donoradvised2015/. 
 10. See Alicia Philipp & Terry Mazany, The Special Standing of Community Foundations 
as Sponsors of Donor-Advised Funds, B.C. F. ON PHILANTHROPY & THE PUB. GOOD 205, 209 
(2015), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=phil 
anthropy-forum (noting that “[t]he DNA of a commercial gift fund is based on the profit-
motive of the parent company” and that community foundations are different). 
 11. Legal scholarship has largely ignored the community foundation and its role in 
philanthropy. The main legal work on community foundations is CHRISTOPHER R. HOYT, 
LEGAL COMPENDIUM FOR COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS (1996), which is now out of print. 
More recent scholarship includes Mark Sidel, Law, Philanthropy and Social Class: Variance 
Power and the Battle for American Giving, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1145 (2003); Mark Sidel, Re-
cent Developments in Community Foundation Law: The Quest for Endowment Building, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 657 (2010). 
 12. A companion piece to this Article is Roger Colinvaux, Donor Advised Funds: Char-
itable Spending Vehicles for 21st Century Philanthropy, 92 WASH. L. REV. 39 (2017), in which 
the author, Colinvaux, argues that DAFs within the national sponsoring organizations 
should be required to distribute contributions within a reasonable period of time. That arti-
cle leaves open the question of whether DAFs sponsored by community foundations 
should be subject to the same requirement. 
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purposes in order to make them more distinct. Part III then con-
siders the possible content of a definition of the community foun-
dation in the Internal Revenue Code in terms of their purpose, 
governance, and operations, taking into account longstanding pol-
icy concerns about donor control of foundation assets and in-
come accumulations. 
The Article concludes that a strong affirmative Code-based 
definition of community foundation could help preserve place-
based philanthropy. Although a definition might not seem in the 
short-term interest of community foundations, over the long-term, 
a definition should endow the community foundation with much 
stronger legal foundations and a clearer identity for the next cen-
tury of philanthropy. 
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR THE TAX STATUS  
OF COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS 
A. Background of Public-Private Charity Distinction 
As a guiding principle, federal income tax law makes a crude 
but fundamental distinction between public and private charities, 
with public charity being the preferred form.13 
Public charities tend to be more active; private charities more 
passive. In general, a charity is public in nature either because the 
activity gains widespread public support through donations (thus 
proving its public character), or because the activity is grounded 
in the local community, i.e., as a church, hospital, university, or 
museum. A charity is private in nature when it generally reflects 
the inclinations of an individual or family, and instead of conduct-
ing activities, makes grants over time.14 To the extent donors con-
trol charitable resources, as with a “private” foundation, there is a 
 
 13. For a general discussion of the distinction between public charity and private 
foundation, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOP-
MENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 82–99 (Comm. Print 2005). 
 14. Id. 
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greater risk that the public interest will not be served. Thus, pri-
vate charities are subject to tougher rules.15 
The community foundation is a distinct philanthropic type 
that has never fit neatly within the public-private dichotomy. The 
name itself suggests the conflict. The “community” in community 
foundation reflects the public side of serving a distinct communi-
ty; the “foundation” suggests a private side, accumulating donor 
funds and making grants. 
As discussed in this Part, for tax classification purposes, the 
public side prevailed in the end. Community foundations were 
classified as public charities, but in a manner so abstruse that the 
community foundation is largely hidden within the philanthropic 
taxonomy, a vague presence that seems important but is largely 
unknown to the wider public and to policymakers. 
B. Community Foundation Origins 
The original community foundation was formed in Cleveland 
in 1914 to solve a problem of dead hand control.16 At that time, the 
president of the Cleveland Trust Company (CTC), F.M. Goff, was 
frustrated by the workings of trust law.17 Under ordinary trust 
principles, charitable trust funds held by CTC had to be used in 
accordance with the donor’s wishes unless a waiver could be ob-
tained in court by use of the cy pres procedure.18 Cy pres was ex-
pensive, time consuming, and not certain of success.19 Thus, it was 
extremely difficult for CTC to try to vary a donor’s outdated wish-
es and escape from the “dead hand.” 
As a way around the problem, Goff developed what became 
known as the “Cleveland Plan.”20 Under this Plan, donors would 
 
 15. Private foundations are subject to a wide range of excise taxes on operations, a 
payout requirement, a tax on investment income, and donors receive fewer benefits for do-
nations. Public charities face far fewer restrictions. I.R.C. §§ 509, 4940–4945 (2012). 
 16. See HOYT, supra note 11, at 3; Norman A. Sugarman, Community Foundations, in 
3 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND 
PUBLIC NEEDS 1689, 1689 (1977). Written for the Filer Commission, the Sugarman article is 
an excellent resource describing the history and role of community foundations as of the 
mid-1970s. Many of the questions raised by Sugarman remain relevant today. 
 17. Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1689. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1689–90. 
1.COLINVAUX_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/18  10:35 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
8 
agree when funding the charitable trust that a committee would 
have the power to change the purpose of the trust and make dis-
tributions if the donor’s intent became obsolete or conditions 
changed.21 The distribution committee’s membership would be se-
lected by prominent local public officials and community leaders, 
who presumably would be among the best informed about com-
munity needs.22 
The Cleveland Plan thereby established the initial characteris-
tics of the community foundation. The basic idea was of a gift, 
made in trust, with a corporate bank as trustee, and with ultimate 
distribution authority placed in a specially constituted committee. 
The “community” in the community foundation thus appears to 
have come from both the makeup of the distribution committee as 
well as a reference to a geographic area. Goff’s key innovation was 
that charitable trust funds ultimately would be managed, not by 
the dead hand of the donor, but by the community.23 
Ultimately, the community foundation proved to be an attrac-
tive model of philanthropy, and community foundations were 
created across the country.24 The initial philanthropic niche served 
 
 21. This became known as the variance power. According to the Cleveland Founda-
tion, Goff once explained the need to rid community trusts from the yoke of the dead hand 
to better allow donor contributions to be used by the community foundation’s board for 
the benefit of the community for “such charitable purposes as will best make for the men-
tal, moral, and physical improvement of the inhabitants of Cleveland.” See Our History, 
CLEVELAND FOUND., http://www.clevelandfoundation.org/about/history (last visited Jan. 
17, 2018). 
 22. In addition, CTC housed the investment authority of the trust funds with a pro-
fessional corporate trustee (a bank), which acted as a fiduciary. See id.; see also Sugarman, 
supra note 16, at 1689. 
 23. Inevitably, the Cleveland Plan evolved. The original plan had one bank as trustee 
of the charitable funds. Over time, multiple banks in the community would serve as trus-
tees within a single community foundation. In addition, the form of the community foun-
dation expanded from its origins as a committee with oversight of charitable trust distribu-
tions, to the corporate form. Thus, instead of a free-standing committee with power to 
make distributions from a charitable trust, the corporate community foundation could ac-
cept and manage contributions directly, not necessarily in trust. A distribution committee 
would still be selected from the community but formally would be a part of the corpora-
tion. Some hybrids also emerged. Corporate community foundations might undertake the 
distribution role but use bank trustees to manage the investments, either in trust form, or 
not. Also, funding sources expanded to focus not just on bequests but also inter-vivos giv-
ing. Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1690–91. 
 24. The earliest foundations typically were established in large urban centers, but 
some community foundations had a broader geographic reach—including statewide foun-
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by community foundations was to fund long-term community 
projects through bequests or large inter-vivos transfers and not for 
current spending.25 This complemented more traditional ap-
proaches to charitable funding through organizations like the 
United Way, which focused on smaller gifts for immediate 
needs.26 The community foundation—endowment funds profes-
sionally managed by and for the benefit of local communities—
filled a gap in the private provision of philanthropy. 
C. Legal Status of the Community Foundation Before 1969 
and the Rise of Policy Concerns 
Because the early federal income tax law of charities did not 
distinguish among 501(c)(3) organizations, once community foun-
dations were established as charitable tax-exempt organizations, 
they presented no special questions of further classification.27 This 
changed in modest ways mid-century. 
 
dations to serve more rural populations (e.g., the Rhode Island Foundation was established 
in 1921). 
 25. See Berman, supra note 6, at 13–14. 
 26. Importantly, community foundations did not view the United Way funding 
model as competition. Rather the two charity types were seen as partners, with separate 
roles to play, that attracted different donations. Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1691. United 
Way served current needs and did not seek endowment funds, in part because doing so 
would discourage its regular donor base who might be dissuaded to give to an apparently 
wealthy organization. As stated by the executive director of the United Way in 1956:  
Both endowment funds for future benefits and current funds for operating ex-
penses should play a vital role in financing communal enterprises, but it would 
seem best not to mix the two in a single organization. . . . Community founda-
tions constitute ideal partners for Community Chests and United Funds in 
rounding out the financing picture . . . . 
Id. (quoting a speech by Ralph Blanchard). 
 27. The 501(c)(3) status of a community foundation was never in doubt and is long 
established. From the outset, the Code has provided exemption for any corporation or a 
“community chest, fund, or foundation” organized and operated exclusively for an exempt 
purpose. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). Under this standard, a community foundation that col-
lects and administers funds to be paid for charitable, educational, religious, scientific, or 
literary purposes qualifies as a 501(c)(3) organization, whether the foundation takes the 
corporate or the trust form. For convenience, the Code section 501(c)(3) is used although 
the original section number was different. 
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1. Anti-abuse rules 
The first significant change for present purposes was in 1950 
when Congress passed a series of anti-abuse rules targeted at pri-
vate foundations.28 Like community foundations, private founda-
tions were a known philanthropic type. Typically founded and 
controlled by a single donor or family, private foundations pre-
sented special problems of donor control and abuse. Specifically, 
Congress was concerned about self-dealing, accumulations of in-
come, risky investments, and spending that was not for charita-
ble purposes.29 
The desire to regulate a portion of the charitable sector, but the 
absence of a legal definition for any charitable subtype meant that 
Congress had to create categories.30 Conceptually, Congress drew 
a line between public and private charities. Public charities would 
escape the new rules because public organizations were “not be-
lieved likely to become involved” in the prohibited transactions.31 
To establish the public-private distinction, Congress defined 
the target in the negative, imposing rules of general applicability, 
with exemptions for large swaths of “public” 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions. Exempted charities included: churches, schools, hospitals, 
and a more generic category of publicly supported organizations.32 
Significantly, the 1950 legislation also established the public 
support category as a generic public charity classification that es-
caped extra regulation.  
 
 28. See Laurens Williams & Donald V. Moorehead, An Analysis of the Federal Tax Dis-
tinctions Between Public and Private Charitable Organizations, in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED 
BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2099, 2101 (1977). Con-
gress was also concerned with abuses at charitable trusts. 
 29. Id. at 2101–02. 
 30. Congress had also started drawing lines for purposes of filing requirements and 
payment of taxes on unrelated business income. 
 31. S. REP. NO. 81-2375 (1950). One set of rules, deemed “prohibited transactions,” 
were directed at self-dealing. Under these rules, certain transactions with insiders, such as 
loans, compensation, or sales, were prohibited unless the transaction was at arm’s length. 
Another set of anti-abuse rules focused on best practices. These rules barred unreasonable 
accumulations of income, investments that jeopardized exempt purposes, and substantial 
spending for non-charitable purposes. The penalty under both regimes was loss of exempt 
status. For additional discussion, see Williams & Moorehead, supra note 28, at 2101–02. 
 32. Williams & Moorehead, supra note 28, at 2102. 
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2. Charitable deduction rules 
In the same time period, Congress changed the charitable-
deduction rules to reflect a preference for public charities. Initial-
ly, donors were subject to a single cap, which limited the amount 
donors could claim as charitable deductions each year as a per-
centage of adjusted gross income. In 1954, Congress created a sec-
ond, higher percentage limit, enabling greater deductibility for 
contributions to certain 501(c)(3) organizations.33 Congress singled 
out contributions to churches, schools, and hospitals as eligible for 
the higher cap.34 By default, gifts to all other charities, including 
community foundations, remained subject to the lower percent-
age limit. 
Through this action, Congress created a lasting category of per 
se or automatic public charities. The church, school, and hospital 
were singled out as quintessentially public institutions, presuma-
bly because of their function and clear role in civic life.35 There 
were no special requirements, apart from being a church, school, 
or hospital. In essence, Congress made the determination, based 
on its judgment, that these institutions merited preferential treat-
ment over other charities under the tax laws. 
Ten years later, in 1964, Congress added publicly supported 
organizations to the list of charities eligible for the higher percent-
age limit.36 This generic category filled in the gap caused by the 
1954 legislation. Although some “public” institutions like church-
es, schools, and hospitals are easy to identify by their core func-
tion, many other charities arguably are no less public but harder 
to describe legislatively. The legislative history cited the 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. at 2102–03. 
 35. In 1952, Congress raised the generally applicable percentage limitation. At that 
time, the Senate Finance Committee report provided that: “Your committee is of the opin-
ion that by increasing the 15-percent limit to 20 percent, much-needed relief will be given 
to colleges, hospitals and other organizations who are becoming more and more dependent 
upon private contributors to enable them to balance their budgets and carry on their pro-
grams.” S. REP. NO. 82-1584 (1952). When these organizations received their own distinct 
limitation in 1954, the legislative history provided simply: “This amendment is designed to 
aid these institutions in obtaining the additional funds they need, in view of their rising 
costs and the relatively low rate of return they are receiving on endowment funds.” Wil-
liams & Moorehead, supra note 28, at 2101 (quoting S. REP. NO.  83-1622 (1954)). 
 36. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 209(a), 78 Stat. 19, 43–47. 
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“many cultural and educational organizations and major charita-
ble organizations” that perform “many beneficial activities.”37 Un-
like with the anti-abuse rules, this time Congress defined the pub-
licly supported category as one that normally received a 
substantial part of its support from the government or from the 
general public.38 
Thus, after the 1964 legislation, 501(c)(3) organizations could 
claim a preferred status for charitable deduction purposes in 
one of two ways: based on core function or just because the 
group had sufficient support from the public. Community foun-
dations would have to qualify, if at all, by virtue of being public-
ly supported. Private foundations, almost by definition, would 
not qualify.39 
Subsequently, the Treasury Department wrote regulations to 
define the publicly supported category.40 The regulations used 
two alternative tests: a mechanical public-support test and a test 
based on the facts and circumstances.41 Because community foun-
dations relied extensively on bequests for support, and support 
could be sporadic, it would likely be difficult for community 
foundations to satisfy the mechanical test. Nevertheless, the 
Treasury Department made the judgment that community foun-
dations were public charities and provided an example in the reg-
ulations showing that a community foundation could satisfy the 
facts and circumstances test.42 The key facts and circumstances 
were having a fundraising program that attracted public support, 
a publicly representative governing body, and the publication of 
annual reports.43 
In sum, community foundations were not “public” enough 
based on their function to qualify for per se public charity status. 
 
 37. S. REP. NO. 88-830 (1964). 
 38. Public support did not include “exempt function income,” i.e., program service 
revenue. Id. 
 39. Lest there was any doubt, the legislative history was clear: the benefit was “not 
available in the case of a private foundation.” Id. 
 40. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(c) (1968). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. § 1.170-2(c)(5), Example 1 (1968). 
 43. In addition, the regulations recognized the community foundation, in trust form, 
as a single entity for tax purposes, rather than a handful of separate trusts. See Sugarman, 
supra note 16, at 1700–01. 
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However, in the judgment of the Treasury Department they were 
considered publicly supported and thus eligible for favorable 
treatment under the charitable deduction rules as public charities. 
D. The 1969 Act 
Even as the 1964 regulations were being written, private foun-
dations were under intense scrutiny in Congress and at the Treas-
ury Department. Hearings conducted by Representative Wright 
Patman into abusive practices at private foundations led to the 
seminal Treasury Department Report on Private Foundations,44 
which in turn provided the base for rules adopted in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969.45 
As is well known, the 1969 Act finally codified the distinction 
between public charity and private foundation, cementing this 
distinction as the principal sorting device for 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions through the present day. Notably, the distinction largely fol-
lowed the policy concerns and categories that animated the 1950, 
1954, and 1964 legislation. Self-dealing, accumulations of income, 
risky investments, and spending not for charitable purposes all con-
tinued to be regulated, but with bright-line rules and excise taxes46 
instead of arm’s-length standards and loss of exempt status.47 
For community foundations, classification as public or private 
became magnified in importance. Not only did even more favora-
ble charitable deduction rules turn on the distinction,48 but the op-
erational constraints of the private-foundation excise-tax regime 
would have cramped the community foundation model, not to 
 
 44. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T., 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEP’T REP. ON PRIVATE FOUN-
DATIONS (Comm. Print 1965). 
 45. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. See generally Thomas A. 
Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundation Law: Historical Perspectives on Its Origins and Underpin-
nings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 52 (2000). 
 46. I.R.C. §§ 4941–4945 (2012). 
 47. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, 29–60 (Comm. Print 1970). 
 48. Congress added private operating foundations and conduit foundations to the 
list of favored charities (for deduction purposes). See Williams & Moorehead, supra note 28, 
at 2111. Congress also largely eliminated the incentive to give noncash property to private 
foundations, making public charity classification even more important. See Roger 
Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined, 50 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 263, 273 n.58 (2013). 
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mention the loss of exemption from tax on investment income.  Fur-
ther, as primarily a grant-making charity, community foundations 
shared some characteristics with private foundations, raising anew 
the question of whether community foundations were distinct. 
There was reason to believe, however, that Congress did not 
intend for community foundations to be placed in the “private” 
charity category. For one thing, private foundations, not commu-
nity foundations, were the focus of the Patman hearings and the 
Treasury Report.49 Further, in the 1969 Act, Congress retained the 
“publicly supported” category from the 1964 legislation, which, 
pursuant to Treasury regulations, included community founda-
tions. Thus it could be argued that Congress in 1969, by remaining 
silent, broadly agreed with the Treasury Department that com-
munity foundations were publicly supported charities.50 
Nevertheless, the elevated significance of the public-private 
distinction in the 1969 Act led the Treasury Department to write 
new regulations on the publicly supported category.51 Although 
the new regulations kept the frame of the earlier ones by adopting 
a mechanical public-support test and a facts-and-circumstances 
test (known as the ten-percent-of-support test), the Treasury De-
partment changed the content of the facts-and-circumstances 
test.52 Under the new test, public support had to be garnered with-
in a four-year period.53 Community foundations would find the 
test hard to satisfy if the main source of funding was by bequest.54 
Further, it was not clear under the regulations whether a loose as-
semblage of trusts, which typified the community foundation, 
would count as an organization for purposes of being a publicly 
supported organization.55 
In short, for present purposes, from the standpoint of commu-
nity foundations, what emerged from the 1969 Act regulations 
was uncertainty. Some community foundations received public-
 
 49. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 44. 
 50. See Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1701. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1701–02. 
 55. See id. 
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charity status, but not all. As summarized by one commentator at 
the time: 
The community foundations without favorable public-charity 
rulings are in limbo; they have no assurance or recognition by 
the I.R.S. of public-charity classification nor a set of rules for 
achieving that status. The unevenness of the present situation is 
a deterrent to many community foundations which it is hoped 
will be corrected in the near future.56 
E. The Community Foundation Regulations 
1. Significance of the regulations 
Correction came in 1976 in the form of regulations for commu-
nity foundations.57 The regulations cemented the public-charity 
status of community foundations through special rules that con-
structed the public-support test to ensure that community founda-
tions could qualify as public charities. Although the regulations 
formally apply only in the community trust context (as opposed to 
a corporate structure), they nonetheless have a broader significance. 
At the outset, it is important to note the significance of having 
community foundation regulations at all. Critically, it meant that 
the Treasury Department through regulations, and not Congress 
through the Internal Revenue Code, made the determination of 
community foundation status. Thus, although community foun-
dations achieved their goal of public-charity status, the tax classi-
fication occurred through an obscure regulatory interpretation of 
the Code, not directly by Congress. 
In addition, as a special interpretation of the publicly support-
ed category, the tax status of community foundations ultimately 
rests on a regulatory judgment. Just as Congress named the 
church, school, and hospital as per se public charities, the Treas-
ury Department assessed the community foundation archetype 
and determined that community foundations were per se public 
charities. In other words, the Treasury Department was persuaded 
 
 56. Id. at 1702. 
 57. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(10)–(11) (as amended in 2011). Regulations were pro-
posed in 1971; Community Trusts and Effect of Restrictions and Conditions upon Distribu-
tions of Net Assets, 36 Fed. Reg. 19598 (Oct. 8, 1971). 
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that community foundations, as a specific type of charity, categor-
ically should qualify as public charities and that it was necessary to 
write special rules to ensure that conclusion. 
The judgment of the Treasury Department is illustrated in the 
introduction to the regulations, which describes the community 
foundation in general terms, before setting out prescriptive rules. 
Community trusts have often been established to attract large 
contributions of a capital or endowment nature for the benefit of 
a particular community or area, and often such contributions 
have come initially from a small number of donors. While the 
community trust generally has a governing body comprised of 
representatives of the particular community or area, its contribu-
tions are often received and maintained in the form of separate 
trusts or funds, which are subject to varying degrees of control 
by the governing body.58 
In a descriptive not prescriptive sense, the Treasury Depart-
ment took notice of the funding model, governance structure, 
and purpose of the community foundation. The Treasury De-
partment acknowledged through this language that the communi-
ty foundation is a distinct type of charity that is public in na-
ture and outlines its essential characteristics, which date to Goff’s 
original vision. 
2. Special public-support test for community foundations 
The main operative rule of the regulations provides communi-
ty foundations a special way to satisfy the facts-and-circumstances 
public-support test. The Treasury Department takes into account 
the unique funding model for community foundations and pro-
vides that 
[the] requirement of attraction of public support . . . generally 
will be satisfied, if [community trusts] seek gifts and bequests 
from a wide range of potential donors in the community or area 
served, through banks or trust companies, through attorneys or 
other professional persons, or in other appropriate ways which 
call attention to the community trust as a potential recipient of 
 
 58. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(10). 
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gifts and bequests made for the benefit of the community or ar-
ea served.59 
In other words, the regulations conclude that for purposes of 
satisfying the public-support test, what matters is that ongoing 
public support is sought, and sought from the community served. The 
requirement that ongoing public support is sought helps to dis-
tinguish community foundations from private foundations, which 
do not need to seek ongoing support. The requirement that sup-
port is sought from the community served helps establish, as a 
matter of law, that there is a public base of support (the communi-
ty), and because of the support, the community served will be suf-
ficiently vested in the community foundation to provide effec-
tive oversight. 
Further, the regulations then distinguish the community foun-
dation from the other models of public support (as typified by the 
United Way): 
A community trust is not required to engage in periodic, com-
munity-wide, fundraising campaigns directed toward attracting 
a large number of small contributions in a manner similar to 
campaigns conducted by a community chest or united fund.60 
This distinction drives home the point that for community foun-
dations the “public” aspect of their support is found more 
through an established relationship between the organization and 
the community than in any specific funding formula. 
3. Ensuring community foundation autonomy 
Special rules for the public-support test are but one part of the 
regulations. The remaining, more extensive rules address tech-
nical problems with recognizing community foundations in trust 
form as public charities and concerns about donor control of 
foundation assets. The rules are important to outline because 
they establish a baseline for the public-charity status of the com-
munity foundation. 
 
 59. Id. Again, this language is from the introduction to community trust regulations. 
 60. Id. 
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As a technical matter, the need for rules arose because when a 
community foundation oversees a number of trusts, the “entity” 
for tax purposes is each individual trust.61 Legal title to trust assets 
resides in the trust, not the foundation. Accordingly, as a formal 
matter, each trust would be viewed distinctly for exemption pur-
poses and inevitably would be classified as a private foundation 
with one source of support (the trust donor). A related, more sub-
stantive concern was that, as a trust, the donor might retain signif-
icant influence over, if not effective control of, trust assets. 
To get around the technical problem, the regulations took a 
substance-over-form approach by creating a legal fiction of the 
community trust as a single entity. As such, each individual trust 
is viewed as a component of a larger fund, not as a separate entity. 
This allows all the component funds of the community foundation 
to be the basis for the public-support test and thus allows the 
community foundation to qualify as a public charity. 
There are several requirements for a community foundation to 
be treated as a single entity in the trust context.62 These are known 
as the “single-entity test.” 
• “The organization must be commonly known as a com-
munity trust, fund, foundation or other similar name 
conveying the concept of a capital or endowment fund 
to support charitable activities . . . in the community or 
area it serves” (the “name” test).63 
• “All funds of the organization must be subject to a 
common governing instrument” (the “common instru-
ment” test).64 
• “The organization must have a common governing body 
or distribution committee . . . which either directs or . . . 
monitors the distribution of all funds exclusively for char-
itable purposes” (the “common governing body” test).65 
 
 61. George Johnson & David Jones, Community Foundations, in EXEMPT ORGANIZA-
TIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 1994, at pt. 4 (1994). 
 62. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(11). 
 63. Id. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(iii). 
 64. Id. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(iv). 
 65. Id. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(v)(A). 
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• “[T]he governing body must have the power [the ‘vari-
ance power’]  . . . to modify any restriction . . . on the dis-
tribution of funds,” and to replace any trustee, either for 
breach of fiduciary duty or for failure to make a reason-
able investment return.66 Further, the governing body 
must commit itself (by resolution or otherwise) to the 
exercise of these powers and to achieving a reasonable 
investment return.67 
• “The organization must prepare periodic financial re-
ports treating all the funds [it holds], . . . either directly 
or in component parts, as funds of the organization” (the 
“reporting” test).68 
These requirements, woven into the fabric of the community 
foundation identity, are simple to state and to satisfy, but also to 
overlook. Their significance, however, deserves emphasis. 
The name test, although arguably superficial, importantly 
speaks to the sense in which a community foundation is linked by 
name to a specific community. To be considered public, communi-
ty foundations must be named for and known by the community 
or area served. In other words, the “community” identity is a key 
aspect of classification as a public charity. 
The common-instrument and common-governing-body tests 
are of obvious importance to show that the component funds are 
subject to a single governance structure and, therefore, generally 
independent from donor control. The reporting test also helps to 
prove that the component funds are treated as a whole, not as dis-
tinct parts. 
For purposes of countering donor control and ensuring foun-
dation autonomy, the variance power is the most important 
test.  As a matter of law, ultimate power over trust funds must be 
vested in the “sole judgment” of the governing body, not the do-
nor. Recall that the variance power was F.M. Goff’s solution to 
dead-hand control,69 and as exemplified in the regulations, was 
 
 66. Id. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(v)(B)(1)–(3). 
 67. Id. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(v)(E)–(F). Failure to use the power when circumstances indi-
cate use should result in loss of public charity status. 
 68. Id. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(vi). 
 69. See supra Section I.B. 
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central to the legal classification of the community foundation as a 
public charity. 
In addition to the single-entity test, which applies at the com-
munity foundation level, the “component part” test applies to 
each fund.70 The component-part test permits the fund to be con-
sidered a part of the community foundation (and so not itself a 
separate entity) and is intended to prevent donor control of 
trust assets.71 
The component-part test has two parts. First, the trust or fund 
must be created by gift or other transfer to a community founda-
tion that is treated as a single entity under the regulations.72 This 
requirement protects against donor control by making clear that 
the gift is to a foundation that satisfies the name, common-
instrument, common-governing-body, variance power, and re-
porting tests. The effect is to make clear that it is the community 
foundation, through satisfaction of the single-entity requirements, 
and not the trust that has control over trust assets. 
Second, the donor may not subject the trust or fund assets to 
any material restriction.73 In general, the no-material-restriction 
rules allow donors to designate a charitable recipient at the time of 
gift and provide advice, but not direction, regarding distributions 
after the gift is made.74 The point of the material restriction rules is 
to restrain donor control.75 Thus, it is a built-in condition of public 
charity status for community foundations that the donor cannot 
materially restrict fund assets. 
Taken all together, the regulations following the codification 
of the public-private distinction take a two-step approach to pub-
lic charity status for community foundations. First, the regulations 
deem that community foundations are publicly supported based 
on a fundraising standard that merely requires that the founda-
tion seek funds from a “wide range of potential donors in the 
 
 70. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(ii). 
 71. Johnson & Jones, supra note 61, at pt. 4, § B. 
 72. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(ii)(A). 
 73. Id. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(ii)(B). 
 74. “Material restriction” is defined elsewhere in the regulations and discussed in 
more detail infra text at notes 104 to 113. 
 75. The single entity test is a more indirect restraint on donor control. 
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community.”76 Then, the regulations include indirect (the single-
entity test) and direct (the component-part test) protections 
against donor control of funds, so as to justify not subjecting com-
munity foundations to the private foundation anti-abuse regime. 
In both cases, a key idea is that the power to oversee and distrib-
ute fund assets rests with the community (the public face of the 
foundation), not the donor. 
F. Summary 
From a historical perspective, as Congress developed distinc-
tions among charitable organizations, community foundations 
worked their way into the favored, public-charity class. With 
promulgation of the community foundation regulations, the 
community foundation successfully carved out a niche within the 
U.S. model of philanthropy. The community foundation, unique-
ly, raised endowment funds from multiple sources for the benefit 
of a geographic area. Community foundations were not seen as 
presenting the same level of risk of donor control and lack of pub-
lic oversight as private foundations, even though both philan-
thropic types primarily are grant-making organizations. The 
Treasury Department deliberately took steps in regulations to de-
fine the publicly supported charity category in a way to include 
community foundations but also recognized the need to protect 
against donor control. So although community foundations ended 
up as a public charity, intervention by the Treasury Department 
was required. 
II. THE CHALLENGE TO COMMUNITY FOUNDATION IDENTITY 
A. National Sponsoring Organizations and Donor-Advised Funds 
The final Treasury regulations provided community founda-
tions a path to public charity status and secured their role in phi-
lanthropy, for a time. However, at the turn of the century, the ad-
vent of national sponsoring organizations (NSOs) upset the status 
quo. National sponsoring organizations present a challenge to 
 
 76. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(10). 
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community foundations because both types of charities engage in 
the same activity: the sponsoring of donor-advised funds (DAFs).77 
Community foundations pioneered the donor-advised fund in 
the early 1930s.78 The main idea is that donors make a completed 
gift to a sponsoring organization (which could be any charity), the 
sponsoring organization segregates the gift into a distinct account 
typically in the donor’s name (the DAF),79 and then the donor ad-
vises the sponsoring organization on an ongoing basis about how 
to distribute fund assets for charitable purposes.80 The donor’s ad-
vice, though usually followed, is not binding on the sponsoring 
organization, which formally owns and controls the funds.81 In 
general, DAFs are attractive because DAFs provide donors with a 
charitable contributions deduction for federal income tax purpos-
es in the year of the gift, while allowing donors to delay indefi-
nitely the decision about which charity to support. 
The donor-advised fund was relatively obscure until the rise 
of NSOs. An NSO is a public charity with a national focus that 
administers DAFs as its main activity.82 Many NSOs are affiliated 
with a large investment firm, like Fidelity, Schwab, or Vanguard 
(to name three of the biggest). NSOs with commercial affiliations 
 
 77. DAF-sponsoring organizations include NSOs, community foundations, and oth-
er charities, such as universities and religious organizations, which use DAFs as a supple-
mental giving tool. NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TR., 2015 DONOR-ADVISED FUND REPORT (2016), 
https://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/pdfs/donor-advised-fund-report-2015.pdf. The Na-
tional Philanthropic Trust divides sponsors into three categories: national sponsors, com-
munity foundations, and single-issue sponsors. The Treasury Department offers a similar 
taxonomy. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUPPORTING 
ORGANIZATIONS AND DONOR ADVISED FUNDS 21 (2011) (noting that sponsoring organiza-
tions include “charitable organizations formed by financial institutions for the principal 
purpose of offering DAFs, community foundations, universities, [supporting organiza-
tions], and other tax-exempt organizations”). 
 78. See Berman, supra note 6, at 13. 
 79. I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2)(A) (2012) (defining donor-advised fund). 
 80. See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN ANAL-
YSIS OF CHARITABLE GIVING AND DONOR ADVISED FUNDS 3 (2012) [hereinafter CRS  REPORT]. 
 81. I.R.C. § 170(f)(18)(B). But see SHERLOCK & GRAVELLE, supra note 80 (noting that 
“[e]vidence suggests . . . that donors to DAFs have effective control over grants, and to 
some extent investments, because sponsoring organizations typically follow the donor’s 
advice”); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 77, at 69 (noting that one respondent 
thought that DAFs “appear to give DAF donors de facto control over investment and dis-
tribution decisions”). 
 82. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 77, at 69 (stating that “nearly all, if not 
all” of their activity “is administering DAFs”). 
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have access to a ready supply of potential donors and reason to 
solicit them.83 The first commercially sponsored NSO, the Fidelity 
Charitable Gift Fund, became a 501(c)(3) charity with minimal IRS 
review in 1991 and today is the largest charity in the United States 
in terms of annual fundraising—an incredible ascent.84 Two other 
NSOs, the Schwab Charitable Fund and the Vanguard Charitable 
Endowment Program, are fourth and eleventh respectively.85 
At the outset, NSOs attracted considerable scrutiny.86 Critics 
questioned whether NSOs had a legitimate exempt purpose,87 
whether they were improperly organized for the benefit of the af-
filiated private investment firms,88 if conflicts of interest between 
the NSO charity and the for-profit firm could be resolved,89 the ex-
tent of donor control retained over donated funds,90 and the lack 
of any mandated distribution rule for donated assets.91 Several of 
the issues were resolved in litigation92 and through the exemption 
 
 83. Typically, the investment managers employed by the commercial entity retain 
management of funds contributed to the NSO and so continue to benefit from DAF ac-
counts. See Cantor, supra note 9, at 132. 
 84. See Peter Olsen-Phillips & Brian O’Leary, How Much America’s Biggest Charities 
Raise: 27 Years of Data, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.philanthropy 
.com/interactives/philanthropy-400#id=table_2016 (listing the top 400 charities, measured 
by amount of contributions received). 
 85. Id. 
 86. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine all the issues relating to NSOs. 
For discussion, see Colinvaux, supra note 12. 
 87. Albert R. Rodriguez, The Tax-Exempt Status of Commercially Sponsored Donor-
Advised Funds, 17 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 95, 95–97 (1997). 
 88. Id. at 100–02. 
 89. See Ronald J. Shoemaker & Amy Henchey, Donor Directed Funds, in EXEMPT OR-
GANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996, at 15–16 (1996); see also Cantor, supra note 9. 
 90. Ron Shoemaker et al., Donor Control, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 
299–300 (1999) [hereinafter Donor Control]. 
 91. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE AD-
MINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS 105, 106 (2000) (proposing a distri-
bution rule). 
 92. The exempt purpose of NSOs as collecting and distributing charitable funds was 
affirmed in National Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 486 (1987). The court relied 
on an IRS Revenue Ruling, in which the IRS held that an organization “formed for the pur-
pose of providing financial assistance to several different types of [501(c)(3)] organizations” 
was itself a 501(c)(3) organization. Rev. Rul. 67–149, 1967–1 C.B. 133; see also Fund for 
Anonymous Gifts v. IRS, 194 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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application process.93 Eventually, the IRS lost in court on exempt 
purpose, private benefit, and control issues,94 and ultimately 
yielded to the fact of the NSO by granting public charity status to 
the Vanguard Charitable Endowment after extensive review 
and negotiation.95 
The NSO’s controversial success has had two main, related ef-
fects on community foundations. The first is practical. NSOs have 
focused attention on the donor-advised fund as an activity to be 
regulated, regardless of the type of sponsoring organization.96 As 
a result, community foundations are pulled into legal and policy 
debates not necessarily of their own making and face regulation 
that may not be appropriate to their idealized giving model. The 
second is equally, if not more, serious: because NSOs represent 
such a dominant force in philanthropy, community foundations 
are pulled toward the national, non-consultative NSO-model of 
giving and away from their roots as serving place-based commu-
nities. Both effects, discussed next, dilute the identity of the com-
munity foundation and weaken its ability to fulfill its traditional 
 
 93. The IRS scrutinized exemption applications and signaled in non-precedential 
guidance that it would be guided by the material restriction rules in assessing the exempt 
status of non-community foundation DAFs. Thus, new DAFs were encouraged to fall on 
the right side of the donor advice versus donor direction line. A related issue was whether 
donor directed funds counted as “public support” for purposes of the public support test. 
In addition, the IRS also cited voluntary compliance with a five percent payout as a posi-
tive factor for exempt status. Ron Shoemaker & Bill Brockner, Control and Power: Issues In-
volving Supporting Organizations, Donor Advised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Insti-
tutions, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL 
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 119–22 (2001). 
 94. Nat’l Found., Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 486 (1987); Donor Control, supra note 
90. The control issues were resolved on the ground that the corporate sponsoring organiza-
tion, as a separate and distinct entity, formally had dominion and control over donated 
funds. So long as the sponsoring organization has the clear legal right not to follow donor 
advice, donor advisory privileges are not a bar to a charitable deduction. 
 95. Steve Arkin, Alysa McDaniel & Marc Owens, Vanguard’s Successful March To 
(c)(3) Exemption, Public Charity Status: A Charitable Gift Fund Case Study, 3 PAUL STRECKFUS’ 
EO TAX J. 33 (1998). 
 96. Emmett D. Carson, 21st-Century Community Foundations: A Question of Geography 
and Identity, GRANTCRAFT (2015), http://www.grantcraft.org/guides/21st-century-commu 
nity-foundations?_ga=1.84948633.1430162731.1467123650 (“One of the most perplexing as-
pects about the current discussions on donor-advised funds is that they seldom 
acknowledge the unique differences between donor advised fund providers . . . . Donor 
advised fund providers are not the same in mission, purpose, or operation . . . .”). 
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exempt purpose, potentially turning the community foundation 
into just another sponsor of donor-advised funds. 
B. The Donor-Advised Fund as a Regulated Activity 
After the IRS yielded to the NSO as a bona fide 501(c)(3) or-
ganization, the debate on DAFs shifted to the legislative arena. 
The first salvo was a Treasury Department proposal for DAF leg-
islation as part of the President’s fiscal year 2001 budget.97 The 
Treasury proposal (which did not become law) would have re-
quired all donor-advised funds held by a sponsoring charity to 
pay out (in the aggregate) five percent of assets each year.98 The 
proposal also would have restricted the class of eligible DAF 
grantees.99 Although community foundations were not mentioned 
in the proposal, they would have been subject to the rules. 
In crafting the proposal, the Treasury Department was con-
cerned, among other things, about “[t]he lack of uniform guide-
lines governing the operation of donor advised funds . . . .”100 The 
Treasury Department appears to have concluded that it was ap-
propriate to regulate DAFs as an activity, without regard to spon-
soring organization. Community foundations appeared to be 
caught up in rules that were prompted by the activity of other 
types of charitable organizations, namely NSOs, notwithstanding 
that the DAF had long been used uncontroversially by communi-
ty foundations. 
 
 97. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS 105 (2000). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 106. Under the proposal, for an organization that sponsored DAFs as its 
primary activity (meaning over fifty percent of assets held in DAFs), public charity status 
was available only if: there was no material restriction on any one DAF, DAF distributions 
could be made only to public charities, and, in the aggregate, five percent of total DAF 
assets were paid out each year. Id. Failure to satisfy any of the three conditions resulted 
in private foundation treatment for the sponsoring organization and, therefore, the DAFs 
under its control. Id. In addition, the proposal applied to the DAFs of organizations that 
did not offer DAFs as a primary activity (giving as an example, a school that operates a 
DAF). Id. If such a DAF did not satisfy the three conditions, then it became subject to the 
private foundation rules, though the public charity status of the sponsor was not affected. 
Id. at 106–07. 
 100. Id. at 106. Treasury cited as reasons for legislation the dramatic growth of DAFs, 
concerns about delayed charitable benefits, and the uncertainty regarding their legal status. 
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The Treasury proposal was not re-proposed,101 but the general 
concern about DAFs as an activity without regard to sponsor re-
mained. In 2005, IRS Commissioner Mark Everson testified before 
the Senate Finance Committee about abuses relating to DAFs.102 
Shortly thereafter, amid mounting concerns, DAF legislation was 
enacted in 2006 as part of the Pension Protection Act (PPA).103 
The PPA’s DAF legislation applies equally to all DAFs (as de-
fined), regardless of the DAF’s sponsor.104 This followed the lead 
of the Treasury Department’s goal of uniform ground rules. The 
PPA rules are animated by concerns about donor control and the 
abuse that can result. Accordingly, the rules prohibit most transac-
tions between a DAF and a donor-advisor or related party (e.g., 
sales, loans, compensation) even if at arm’s length. The rules also 
bar DAF grants to individuals or grants for a noncharitable pur-
pose.105 A payout was dropped in the final legislation and re-
placed by limits on the amount of holdings a DAF may maintain 
in any one business.106 
 
 101. The Treasury proposal coincided with the last year of the Clinton Administration 
and was not renewed by the incoming Bush Administration. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2002 REVENUE PROPOS-
ALS (2001). 
 102. Letter from Mark W. Everson, Comm’r of Internal Revenue, to Charles E. Grass-
ley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin. (Mar. 30, 2005), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo 
/media/doc/Letter%20from%20Everson.pdf (describing abuses at donor-advised funds as 
a top compliance problem) (“We have found that certain promoters encourage individuals 
to establish purported donor-advised fund arrangements that are used for a taxpayer’s per-
sonal benefit, and some of the charities that sponsor these funds may be complicit in the 
abuse. The promoters inappropriately claim that payments to these organizations are de-
ductible . . . . Also, they often claim that the assets transferred to the funds may grow tax 
free and later be used to benefit the donor[] . . . to reimburse them for their expenses, or to 
fund their children’s educations.”). 
 103. For a description of all the rules imposed on DAFs, see STAFF OF THE JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH 
CONGRESS 624–44 (2007). The author was involved in the drafting of the donor-advised 
fund legislation. 
 104. There is one exception. DAFs held by a private foundation are not subject to the 
rules. I.R.C. § 4966(d) (2012). 
 105. Id. §§ 4966, 4967. 
 106. The Tax Relief Act of 2005, S. 2020, 109th Cong. § 331 (as passed by the Senate, 
Nov. 18, 2005). The anti-abuse rules largely utilize concepts and rules from the private 
foundation regime, either explicitly adopting the private foundation rules or paralleling 
their substance and bright-lines approach. For additional discussion, see Roger Colinvaux, 
Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 60–63 (2011). Thus, to 
 
1.COLINVAUX_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/18  10:35 AM 
1 Defending Place-Based Philanthropy 
 27 
The PPA also required the Treasury Department to report to 
Congress on a variety of issues relating to DAFs. The subsequent 
Treasury Department report, released in 2011, takes careful note 
of the different types of sponsoring organizations but does not 
make distinctions among sponsoring organizations in its recom-
mendations to Congress.107 
Subsequently, DAFs have remained in the spotlight, with 
some commentators recommending high payouts and limited life 
for donor-advised funds without regard to sponsor.108 Perhaps 
most significantly, in 2014 the Chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee Dave Camp proposed a five-year payout for all donor-
advised fund contributions as part of tax reform.109 
In sum, since the rise of NSOs the unmistakable trend is to 
view DAFs as an activity to be regulated, without regard to spon-
sor. For community foundations, what was once a useful fundrais-
ing tool that attracted little attention has become a point of nation-
al debate.110 The practical impact on community foundations is 
that new donor-advised fund rules inevitably will apply 
to them unless efforts are made to distinguish sponsoring organi-
zations legislatively. 
 
the extent new burdens are imposed on DAFs, these are burdens already borne by pri-
vate foundations. 
 107. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUPPORTING ORGANI-
ZATIONS AND DONOR ADVISED FUNDS (2011). In conclusions largely favorable to the status 
quo, the report concludes that the favorable deduction rules for DAFs are appropriate be-
cause DAFs are not controlled by the donor (unlike a private foundation). In addition, 
Treasury reasoned that although there may be a delay between the timing of the deduction 
and the delivery of charitable benefits, this delay also exists at other public charities, which 
nonetheless benefit from the favorable rules. The report also concluded that a payout on 
DAFs would be premature based on the limited data available. The report did leave open 
the door to future analysis of pay out trends and to work with Congress on whether addi-
tional regulation or legislation would be necessary. 
 108. Lewis B. Cullman & Ray Madoff, The Undermining of American Charity, N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS (July 14, 2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/07/14/the-undermining-of 
-american-charity/. 
 109. Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2014) § 5203 (introduced by Rep. 
Dave Camp). 
 110. Supra notes 10–11. 
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C. NSOs and Harm to the Community Foundation Identity 
The NSOs’ domination of the DAF debate and culture also 
raises a more fundamental issue for community foundations. Not 
only are they potentially subject to new regulations because of 
NSOs, but competition with NSOs is spurring an erosion of the 
traditional role community foundations play in performing, 
and in helping donors perform, effective philanthropy for place-
based communities. 
1. Contrasting roles of community foundations and NSOs 
As a general matter, community foundations have long been 
regarded as having the primary purpose of using grants to sup-
port a place-based community.111 A community foundation histo-
rian describes their “local focus,” “local impact,” support of the 
“local non-profit infrastructure” and as covering a “defined geo-
graphic region.”112 The local focus reflects community foundation 
origins and purpose—to raise funds locally for the benefit of the 
community from which the funds were raised.113 A focus on geo-
graphical location is exemplified in the community foundation 
regulations, discussed in Part I, which stress the importance of 
serving community needs in terms of a “particular community or 
area” and being named accordingly.114 
 
 111. As noted in Part I, exempt status for community foundations has its roots in the 
original tax code, when exemption was provided for a “community chest, fund,  
or foundation.” 
 112. See Sacks, supra note 6, at 5. 
 113. The Supreme Court noticed the role played by community foundations when 
they secured an early amendment to the charitable deduction rules that allowed charitable 
deductions made to a trust, for the use of a charity. Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 480 
(1990) (noting that the legislative history to the Revenue Act of 1921 “indicated that nu-
merous communities had established charitable trusts, charitable foundations, or commu-
nity chests so that individuals could donate money to a trustee who held, invested, and 
reinvested the principal, and then turned the principal over to a committee that distributed 
the funds for charitable purposes.”); see also Hoyt, supra note 11, at 8. 
 114. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(10) (as amended in 2011). It could be argued that use of 
the disjunctive “or” in the phrase “community or area” implies that “community” and “ar-
ea” delineate distinct types of community, with “area” referring to geography and “com-
munity” representing something broader. However, the use of “or area” after “communi-
ty” appears to be intended as a defining limitation on the potential breadth of the word 
“community,” i.e., the two words are intended as synonyms. This interpretation is con-
sistent with the prevailing view of community foundations as place-based philanthropies. 
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The sense of community as place-based is echoed in the field. 
For instance, the definition of community foundation offered by 
the Council on Foundations provides, in part: 
A community foundation is a tax-exempt, nonprofit, autono-
mous, publicly supported, philanthropic institution composed 
primarily of permanent funds established by many separate do-
nors [for] the long-term diverse, charitable benefit of the resi-
dents of a defined geographic area. Typically, a community 
foundation serves an area no larger than a state.115 
Relatedly, community foundations are meant to play a sub-
stantive role in setting the philanthropic agenda. A key function of 
the community foundation board (which is meant to hail from the 
community served) is “identifying and funding community prior-
ities . . . .”116 In general, 
No matter where they are located community foundations are a 
reflection of the communities in which they operate and their 
times. They are human institutions and as such are an expression 
of the values of their founders, their boards and their donors. 
Ideally, the problems that community foundations identify and 
address through their grantmaking and programs reflect the 
most pressing needs in their local areas.117 
The community focus also should carry over to donor-advised 
funds held by the community foundation. Because donor contri-
butions to DAFs are assets of the community foundation, the ex-
pectation is (or should be) that community foundations will play 
an active consultative role in the distribution of advised funds. 
DAFs should be used for the benefit of the community served, 
with expertise of the community foundation furnished to donors 
as they formulate their advice. 
An active role by the community foundation in guiding fund 
distributions (whether or not from a DAF) was solidified by the ma-
terial restriction rules of the community foundation regulations.118 
 
 115. Glossary of Philanthropic Terms, COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, http://www.cof.org 
/content/glossary-philanthropic-terms, (last visited Jan. 17, 2018). 
 116. Sacks, supra note 6, at 5. 
 117. Id. at 9. 
 118. Treas. Reg. § 1.507-2(a)(8). 
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The rules require active involvement by the community founda-
tion (in trust form) in order for a fund to be considered a compo-
nent part of the foundation and so not a private foundation. For 
instance, under the regulations, some or all of the following fac-
tors indicate that there is no material restriction on a gift, and thus 
are encouraged as best practices: 
• Investigation of the donor’s advice by the community 
foundation, which shows that the advice is consistent 
with specific charitable needs most deserving of support 
in the community. 
• Published guidelines listing the specific charitable needs 
of the community, and that the donor’s advice is con-
sistent with those guidelines. 
• An educational program that advises donors and other 
persons of its guidelines that list the specific charitable 
needs most deserving of support. 
• The disbursement by the community foundation of oth-
er funds to the same or similar organizations or charita-
ble needs as those recommended by a specific donor. 
• Solicitations that state that the community foundation 
will not be bound by any advice the donor offers.119 
Taken together, these factors contemplate that the community 
foundation is meant to be more than a mere intermediary. The 
community foundation is expected to investigate donor advice, 
add its expertise of community needs to guide donors better to 
benefit the community, and ensure that advice is consistent with 
the specific needs of the community served. 
The place-based consultative model of the community founda-
tion, however, is in stark contrast to the model offered by NSOs. 
An NSO is primarily a fundraising organization,120 with a national 
focus, that is organized to collect funds and pay them out upon 
donor advice. The NSO performs its exempt purpose through 
 
 119. Id. § 1.507-2(a)(8)(iv)(A)(2)(i)–(v); George Johnson & David Jones, Community 
Foundations, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL 
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994, at 11–12 (1994).  
 120. Rev. Rul. 67-149, 1967-1 C.B. 133; see Colinvaux, supra note 12. 
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spending, not by developing philanthropic priorities based on 
community needs or by building community-based relation-
ships.121 NSOs are designed to be as efficient and low cost as pos-
sible, meaning that for all practical purposes, NSOs by design play 
the limited role of processing donor advice.122 NSOs mainly just 
approve grants to other 501(c)(3) organizations without regard to 
any community or area.123 A national focus makes their adminis-
trative task easier, by diluting the grant-making performed to the 
widest possible field. 
Again, the material-restriction regulations provide a good il-
lustration. These regulations, in addition to showing best practic-
es, set forth the factors that indicate the presence of a material re-
striction on donated funds. If a material restriction exists, donor 
control is considered a concern and the trust fund should be treat-
ed as a private foundation. The reasoning is that the fund exists 
 
 121. For instance, as described by the Treasury Department: “The main characteristic 
of both NDAF groups is that the sponsorship of the DAFs and other similar accounts or 
funds generally appears to constitute the principal activity performed by the sponsoring 
organization. The organizations largely focus on receiving contributions, converting non-
cash donations into a more liquid form, facilitating grant-making, and managing the in-
vestment of DAF assets, rather than the direct provision of charitable services.” DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS AND DONOR ADVISED 
FUNDS 49 (2011). DAFs are but one of several activities for a community foundation. Ac-
cording to the Treasury Department, “[c]ommunity foundations commonly raise funds and 
make grants to support numerous charitable initiatives in their communities, and they hold 
endowments for local charitable projects in a number of funds, often including DAFs.” Id. 
at 51. 
 122. While NSOs principally just sponsor DAFs, community foundations use DAFs as 
one of several fund options to attract donors. One scholar categorized four fund types, 
based on the restrictions imposed on the community foundation by the donor: unrestricted 
funds (no restrictions), field of interest funds (funds for a designated purpose), designated 
funds (the charity is designated in advance), and advised funds (the charity is advised over 
of time). Hoyt, supra note 11, at 5–6. 
 123. See CRS REPORT, supra note 80, at 6 (noting that donor advice is almost always 
approved and is little more than a formality). As one of the leading commentators pointed 
at the time NSOs were developing: “Community foundations often provide to donors 
much greater resources, legal interpretations, reviews of organizations and practical advice 
than do most commercially initiated funds. One commercially initiated fund has been de-
scribed as performing reviews of grant suggestions that consist of a ‘live body walking 
through a room containing an IRS listing of tax-exempt charitable organizations.’ Other 
commercial funds assert that they are providing what the marketplace wants, that is, more 
laissez-faire grantmaking than community foundation regulations and policies would ap-
pear to allow.” Victoria B. Bjorkland, The Emergence of the Donor-Advised Fund, 6 EO TAX 
JOURNAL 15, 18 (May 1998). 
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more to execute the preferences of the donor than that of any in-
dependent charity (i.e., a community foundation). 
Notably, the positive material restriction factors are uncannily 
descriptive of donor-advised funds at an NSO. As a leading ex-
ample, if the “only criterion considered by the [community trust] 
in making a distribution of income or principal from the donor’s 
fund is advice offered by the donor,” then a material restriction 
exists.124 Arguably, a donor’s advice is not the only criterion con-
sidered by NSOs because NSOs require that the organization se-
lected by the donor is a valid charity. This criterion, however, is a 
legal baseline for DAF distributions, not an independent criterion 
of the sponsoring organization.125 Thus, as a practical matter, so 
long as the donor picks a charity recognized by the IRS, the only 
criterion typically used by NSOs in approving distributions is do-
nor advice.126 Accordingly, almost by definition, donor-advised 
funds at NSOs have material restrictions and, but for the corpo-
rate structure, each fund would be treated as a private foundation. 
Other factors from the regulations also point to the fact that 
DAFs at NSOs are laden with material restrictions. A material re-
striction is indicated when: 
• Solicitations [by the organization] state or imply that the 
donor’s advice will be followed[,] [or there is] a pattern 
of conduct that creates an expectation the donor’s advice 
will be followed. 
• The donor’s advice is limited to distributions of amounts 
from his or her fund and the community [foundation] 
has not: (1) done an independent investigation to evalu-
ate whether the donor’s advice is consistent with the 
charitable needs most deserving of support in the com-
munity; or (2) established guidelines that list the specific 
charitable needs of the community. 
 
 124. Treas. Reg. § 1.507-2(a)(8)(iv)(A). In general, NSOs perform the administrative 
function of checking whether an organization is eligible to receive charitable deductions, 
but otherwise, donor advice is the main criterion for distributions. 
 125. In general, distributions from a donor-advised fund must be to a 501(c)(3) organ-
ization or penalty taxes apply. There are exceptions but only if the sponsoring organization 
exercises extensive due diligence with respect to the distributions. See I.R.C. § 4966 (2012). 
 126. CRS REPORT, supra note 80, at 6. 
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• The community foundation only solicits advice from the 
donor regarding distributions from the donor’s fund 
and no procedure is provided for considering advice 
from others. 
• The community foundation follows the advice of all do-
nors concerning their funds substantially all the time.127 
Applying these factors to an NSO: the NSO is built largely on 
the expectation that donor advice will be followed; in general, the 
NSO does the bare minimum in terms of investigation in order to 
keep costs down; NSO accounts are segregated by donor (and do-
nor advisor); and advice is almost always followed. 
In short, the community foundation and the national sponsor-
ing organization have contrasting forms. The vision for communi-
ty foundations to make grants, with community-based expertise 
that will benefit the community. For community foundations, do-
nor-advised funds are one tool, and as originally conceived, the 
ideal is that the community foundation guides the donor-advisor 
toward effective grant-making. The vision of the NSO is quite dif-
ferent. The NSO’s main purpose is to raise funds, invest the funds 
at low cost, and follow donor advice with minimum oversight, for 
the benefit of any eligible charity without regard to community. 
2. Impact of NSOs on community foundations 
Mindful that community foundations and NSOs have distinct 
roles, the question is whether NSOs are having an adverse impact 
on the community foundation. Although impact is difficult to 
quantify, there are reasons to believe that the dominance of the 
NSO in the philanthropic ecosystem directly harms the place-
based mission of the community foundation.128 
One reason relates to the success of the national sponsoring 
organization. Although NSOs are few in number (4.7% of all DAF 
 
 127. Johnson & Jones, supra note 61, at 12–13 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.507-2(a)(8)(iv)(A) 
(3)(i)–(iv)). 
 128. Other factors also undoubtedly challenge the traditional community foundation 
form, such as globalization, a mobile population, and changing donor preferences. As dis-
cussed next, however, by coopting the community foundation model and fundraising 
techniques, the NSO is certainly a leading factor. 
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sponsors),129 they account for a disproportionate amount of all 
DAFs, grants, and contributions.130 This means that NSOs, to a 
considerable extent, set the standard in the marketplace for the 
donor-advised fund. The low-cost, minimal-to-no investigation 
model becomes what donors expect. This puts pressure on com-
munity foundations to conform, both by minimizing the advisory 
role of the community foundation and by expanding the focus of 
donor funds outside of the traditional community.131 
This risk to community foundations is described by Emmett 
Carson, the CEO of the Silicon Valley Community Foundation 
(the nation’s largest community foundation): 
By their very names, community foundations are more than a 
charitable bank account for individual donors. If not, commercial 
gift funds and donor-focused community foundations are dis-
tinctions without a difference. If donor-focused community 
foundations represent the future, they will be eclipsed by com-
mercial gift funds, which are more efficient and offer more in-
vestment choices. The real lesson to be drawn from burgeoning 
donor advised funds is that the convening and community 
building roles of traditional community foundations have enor-
mous value – a value commercial gifts funds and donor-focused 
community foundations are incapable of replicating.132 
 
 129. NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, 2015 DONOR-ADVISED FUND REPORT 3 (2015). 
 130. For 2015, national sponsoring organizations sponsored roughly 57% of all DAFs, 
made 49% of all grants, collected 57% of all contributions, and held nearly 49% of DAF ac-
count asset value. Id. at 8–9 (percentages calculated from Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10). 
 131. See, e.g., Gabriel Kasper, Justin Marcoux & Jess Ausinheiler, What’s Next for Com-
munity Philanthropy: Making the Case for Change, MONITOR INSTITUTE (June 2014), http:// 
monitorinstitute.com/communityphilanthropy/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Over 
view.pdf (“Little by little, a host of different organizations have been chipping away at 
what was once primarily the domain of community foundations. Every service can now be 
provided by some other player in the marketplace, often better, cheaper, or faster than 
community foundations. Online giving platforms like GlobalGiving and Razoo are already 
effectively ‘disintermediating’ community foundations, linking social programs around the 
world directly to new donors—particularly young, tech-savvy donors. Commercial chari-
table gift funds are providing DAFs at extremely low price points. Identity-based funds are 
tailoring their appeals and services to meet the specific needs of rapidly growing racial and 
ethnic populations.”). 
 132. Emmett D. Carson, A Crisis of Identity for Community Foundations, in NAT’L COMM. 
FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY, THE STATE OF PHILANTHROPY 2002, at 7 (2002). 
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Put another way, there is a risk that NSOs will lead DAFs at com-
munity foundations to become donor-centric, not community-
centric, thereby resembling NSOs. 
Related to a shifting focus on donors is a changing notion of 
community away from one based on place. Again, as described by 
Carson, NSOs are forcing community foundations “to redefine 
their value proposition relative to commercial gift funds,”133 a 
process that is causing a “profound identity crisis.”134 Carson asks: 
“What is the meaning of community when it comes to community 
foundations?”135 He notes that “[t]here are a growing number of 
community foundations that are experimenting with broadening 
their reach to accommodate the changing needs of donors,” “ex-
perimenting with the elasticity of community in the 21st century,” 
and “rejecting the tradition of using geographic designation” to 
define community.136 
In its place is a different definition of community, one that 
emphasizes the “shared interest” of a group of people.137 Due to 
growing mobility, people increasingly are connected not by place 
but by interest: 
Connection over shared interests has traditionally happened 
in person in shared spaces, perhaps a church or a coffeeshop 
[sic] or a library. Now, people can easily maintain their rela-
tionships to different places around the world through tech-
nology regardless of the distance involved . . . [through] an al-
most infinite number of online communities in which they 
never physically meet.138 
Carson explores the evolving notion of community with an 
open mind. The concept of “community” should be flexible 
enough, he argues, to include both place-based and interest-based 
communities, arguing that it makes sense for community founda-
tions to “meet[] donors where they are.”139 
 
 133. Carson, supra note 96, at 9. 
 134. Id. at 3. 
 135. Id. at 10. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 5. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 9. 
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Surely Carson is correct that there are multiple ways to define 
a community. The question is whether the “community” in com-
munity foundation, as a specific type of charity, should have legal 
content. The geographic definition Carson cites as “traditional,” 
also happens to be the basis for conferring public charity status on 
the historical community foundation.140 This is not to say that an 
organization that serves a nontraditional community cannot or 
should not be recognized as a 501(c)(3) organization, but rather 
that a place-based community is a principal basis for distinguish-
ing a community foundation from a private foundation or any 
other type of charitable fundraising organization. 
Implicit in this discussion is that the NSO has facilitated the 
shifting notion of community away from geographic place and 
toward issues and ideas. To attract and keep donors, community 
foundations with DAFs face pressure to expand their “communi-
ties.” According to one study, 
Even the definition of community itself is shifting to include affin-
ities based not only on common geographies, but also issues and 
identities. And in some cases, the community is defined by who is 
giving the resources (the community of donors in a particular 
place, who may give to causes all over the world), while in others, 
the focus is on who is receiving assistance (where funds may come 
from anywhere to benefit residents in a particular place).141 
Relatedly, the NSO form also has undermined the place-based 
legal standards that framed the 501(c)(3) status of community 
foundations. As noted, the community foundation regulations 
were conceived to address problems that arose when community 
foundations were organized in the trust form.142 Nevertheless, the 
regulations set forth best practices for community foundations to 
follow, even if not in trust form, in order properly to attain public 
charity status. Thus, the standards of the regulations have guided 
community foundations even if they technically do not apply. 
Indeed, when NSOs emerged and presented legal questions, the 
IRS turned to the community foundation regulations as analogous. 
 
 140. Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1690; Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(10) (as amended in 2011). 
 141. Kasper et al., supra note 131, at 4. 
 142. See supra Section I.E.3. 
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Specifically, the IRS wanted to impose the material-restriction 
rules on NSOs but ultimately did not succeed.143 The Treasury 
Department too invoked the community foundation regulations 
as an answer to regulating DAFs, but also failed.144 The result has 
been that, with the passage of time, what were once best practices 
in the community foundation context (regardless of form) now are 
both of limited applicability and denuded of meaning. In other 
words, before the advent of NSOs, a community foundation 
would be wary of emphasizing a national community or allowing 
material restrictions with respect to its funds. Now, there is little 
reason (for corporate community foundations) to adhere to either 
regulatory standard. 
It is notable here to consider the claim of one of the largest 
NSOs, the Vanguard Charitable Endowment, from its application 
to the IRS for tax-exempt status as a public charity. The challenge 
for Vanguard was to find an analogy it could use to justify public-
charity status. Vanguard chose the community foundation. 
The Endowment considers itself to be a “national community 
foundation” (not a trust) in the sense that it will operate in a 
manner that is similar to many community foundations, albeit 
on a nationwide scale. For example, community foundations 
typically use the vehicle of donor-advised funds as a means to 
attract substantial charitable contributions from persons who 
wish to have some continuing involvement in suggesting how 
such funds may be used. Community foundations also have pro-
cedures for investigating donor recommendations, and the En-
dowment has been guided by the literature on community foun-
dations in the establishment of its own operating procedures. 
Finally, community foundations serve as important educational 
resources in the philanthropic field, providing information to 
prospective donors about the benefits of charitable giving, as 
well as information about prospective grantees.145 
By describing itself as a community foundation, Vanguard co-
opted the community foundation identity to its benefit, while 
 
 143. See supra notes 89–90. 
 144. Supra note 97 (seeking to apply material restriction rules on DAFs). 
 145. Paul Streckfus, Vanguard’s Successful March To (c)(3) Exemption, Public Charity Sta-
tus: A Charitable Gift Fund Case Study, 3 EO TAX JOURNAL 33, 88–89 (1998). Contrast Van-
guard’s representation to the IRS with common understanding in the field. 
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pledging to abide by best practices that technically do not apply. 
Put another way, from the outset, the NSO has been sheltered un-
der the community foundation form but without the rigor. The re-
sult has been to dilute, not enhance, the form—pulling the com-
munity foundation away from its historical roots. 
III. A CODE-BASED DEFINITION OF THE COMMUNITY FOUNDATION 
The rise of the nationally sponsored donor-advised fund chal-
lenges the role of the community foundation in the philanthropic 
ecosystem and jeopardizes place-based philanthropy. The blur-
ring of the lines among DAF-sponsoring organizations causes pol-
icymakers, the public, and even community foundations them-
selves, to conflate the role and purposes of the two distinct 
organization types. Donor-advised funds, regardless of sponsor, 
are a regulatory focus if not a target.146 
One remedy would be to define the community foundation in 
the Internal Revenue Code as a per se public charity. On the posi-
tive side, a Code-based definition would centralize the rules and 
standards applicable to community foundations, and thus provide 
a basis for distinguishing community foundations from NSOs for 
regulatory purposes. For example, if donor-advised funds were in 
the future required to distribute contributions within a certain 
time period, community foundations could be excepted from the 
rule by reference to their definition.147 More broadly, over time, a 
positive legal definition for community foundations could help 
secure the future for place-based philanthropy, educate policy-
makers and the public about the role the community foundation 
has in the U.S. philanthropic system, and enhance the overall 
charitable status of the community foundation. 
On the negative side, from a community foundation perspec-
tive, a definition also doubles as a target. So to the extent commu-
nity foundations become embroiled in scandal or negative associa-
tions, new, adverse, regulatory proposals directed specifically at 
community foundations likely would arise from time to time, 
 
 146. See supra Section II.B. 
 147. This cannot be easily achieved under current law because community founda-
tions are not defined. 
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which would require defensive lobbying. Indeed, community 
foundations may have benefited in the past from having a generic 
public-charity status based on public support—thereby allowing 
them, to a certain extent, to escape notice or legislation targeted 
directly at community foundations. The rise of the donor-advised 
fund in the public consciousness has changed that, however, rais-
ing the stakes. 
This part of the Article considers the possible content for a le-
gal definition of a community foundation. In general, a definition 
should capture the institutional value of the community founda-
tion as a civic leader that utilizes its expertise for the benefit of the 
long- and short-term needs of place-based communities. Any def-
inition should also address the historic policy concerns that attach 
to grant-making charities, especially where donor involvement 
continues after the gift. 
A. A Baseline Definition 
One approach to creating a baseline definition of a community 
foundation would be to codify the community foundation regula-
tions. As discussed in Part I, the central characteristics of the 
community foundation as reflected in the regulations are service 
to a geographic area or community, active solicitation of ongoing 
support, emphasis on long-term community projects or priorities, 
and protection against donor control via an absence of material 
restrictions on gifts and through the variance power. 
Adding to the list of organizations eligible for the favorable 
charitable deduction rules would be one way to codify the regula-
tions. The list would include “a community foundation estab-
lished to attract contributions of a capital or endowment nature 
for the benefit of a particular community or area.”148 This would 
also have the effect of classifying community foundations as pub-
lic charities.149 In general, explanatory legislative history would 
 
 148. The statutory change would be to I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A), perhaps to include a new 
§ 170(b)(1)(A)(ix). It would replace the current basis for favorable treatment for community 
foundations as a publicly supported organization under I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (and the 
community foundation regulations thereunder). The language tracks the introductory lan-
guage from the community foundation regulations; supra text accompanying note 58. 
 149. This assumes no changes to I.R.C. § 509(a)(1). 
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direct the Treasury Department to apply the existing community 
foundation regulations to both trust and corporate form founda-
tions. For trust form foundations, codification would not change 
the underlying law since the regulations already apply. For corpo-
rate form foundations, codification would directly impose the 
regulations, matching the spirit of the law to the letter. 
Codification of the regulations would provide a statutory basis 
for distinguishing community foundations from other 501(c)(3) 
organizations, including DAF-sponsoring organizations. Thus, for 
example, in the context of a legislative proposal to impose a re-
striction on DAFs, it would be easy as a technical matter to make 
an exception to the proposal for the DAFs of community founda-
tions by simple reference to the new term, assuming policymakers 
could be persuaded that an exception was warranted. Codification 
would not directly protect community foundations from generally 
applicable new rules. 
Merely codifying the community foundation regulations, how-
ever, could prove ineffective. One reason to seek a definition 
would be to distinguish the community foundation from other 
charitable organizations. The current regulations, because of their 
history, may prove insufficient to that task. National sponsoring 
organizations were able to argue in general terms that the NSO 
qualified with the spirit of the community foundation rules.150 In 
other words, NSOs did not believe the community foundation 
regulations necessarily presented a bar to the NSO model. 
Further, codification would be a missed opportunity. The 
community foundation regulations were drafted forty years ago. 
Establishing a definition represents an opportunity to make the 
case for community foundations as per se public institutions, with 
sufficient protections against donor control and income accumula-
tion, as well as a sound community-based vision that is key to ad-
dressing vital civic needs. 
B. Codification as a Per Se Public Charity, with New Standards 
Any community foundation definition would likely be forged 
in a challenging legal climate. The underlying theory of public 
 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
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charity status is that the “public” aspect of the charity will protect 
against abuses by insiders or substantial contributors.151 The au-
tomatic or per se public charity classification conferred on certain 
charitable types—churches, hospitals, and schools—also reflects a 
consensus that the charitable mission of such institutions is clear 
and sufficiently important to their constituencies that the possibil-
ity of abuses does not warrant overly intrusive regulation.152 This 
theory, however, has been severely tested in recent years. 
Churches, though likely immune from serious legislative initi-
atives, were the subject of a congressional inquiry and report.153 
Hospitals have had their charitable purpose (and motives) chal-
lenged as not providing sufficient community benefit, with special 
legislation as a result.154 Rising tuition and growing endowments 
at many colleges and universities have drawn attention to in-
come  accumulations and institutional priorities and the prospect 
of legislative reform.155 Abuses at publicly supported credit coun-
seling organizations led to targeted legislation that imposed gov-
ernance standards and operational restrictions on these organiza-
tions.156 The general policy of supporting grant-making orga-
nizations and endowment funds with taxpayer subsidies is being 
questioned, whether the organization is a traditional private foun-
dation, donor-advised fund, supporting organization, or per se 
public charity.157 
 
 151. See, e.g., Quarrie v. Comm’r, 603 F.2d 1274, 1277 (7th Cir. 1979) (“Public charities 
were excepted from private foundation status on the theory that their exposure to public 
scrutiny and their dependence on public support would keep them from the abuses to 
which private foundations were subject.”). 
 152. Supra text accompanying notes 26–27. 
 153. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Tax-Exempt Ministries Avoid New Regulation, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/us/politics/08churches.html. 
 154. I.R.C. § 501(r) (2012). See, e.g., Robert Gebelhoff, Tax-Exempt Hospitals Spend Just 
as Much on Charity Care as For-Profits, Study Finds, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2015), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2015/08/04/tax-exempt-hospitals 
-spend-just-as-much-on-charity-care-as-for-profits-study-finds/. 
 155. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Stop Universities from Hoarding Money, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/19/opinion/stop-universities-from-hoard 
ing-money.html. 
 156. I.R.C. § 501(q). 
 157. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Congress (2014) (introduced by 
Rep. Dave Camp) (proposing a tax on the net investment income of private colleges and 
universities and private operating foundations). 
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In this climate, favorable treatment for community founda-
tions might be promoted by a per se public charity definition that 
directly addresses policy concerns on the key issues of public pur-
pose, governance, and payout. 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of the community foundation is central to any 
case for a per se public charity definition. As noted earlier, the 
501(c)(3) exempt status for community foundations is not in 
doubt. Historically, community foundations have been organized 
and operated exclusively to raise, manage, and distribute en-
dowment funds for the benefit of a particular community. Un-
questionably, this is an exempt purpose. 
The issue is to what extent the purpose is sufficiently “public” 
to support a determination that community foundations automat-
ically should be treated as public charities. As a per se public char-
ity, no public-support test is involved, which means that the issue 
is more a matter of judgment than measurement. Automatic pub-
lic charity status is or should be granted based in part on the in-
herent public characteristics of the philanthropic entity. However, 
it has never been clear what this entails. Automatic status was 
granted historically to institutions that were actively involved in 
the direct provision of services to the community, such as reli-
gious, educational, and health services. 
The community foundation does not neatly fit this model of a 
per se public charity because it is primarily a grant-making insti-
tution.158 But no less than these other institutions, the mission of 
the community foundation is to help meet community needs. The 
community foundation takes on, or should take on, an institution-
al philanthropic identity within the community much like a uni-
versity, hospital, or church. The community foundation is not 
merely a conduit. Rather the community foundation should fill a 
niche within a community by bringing community leaders and 
donors together to invest in long- and short-term community 
needs, to work with other public charities in the community to 
 
 158. Although some community foundations do provide direct charitable services as 
part of the mix of activities offered to the community. 
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determine where funds are most needed, and to develop and fund 
innovative programs for the community—a niche that other pub-
lic charities do not meet. 
Central to this idea is the importance of community. Starting 
with their names, community foundations are named for a com-
munity, not for a family or donor. This is important both as a mat-
ter of form and substance. The name reflects that the purpose of 
the community foundation is to serve community preferences, ra-
ther than the philanthropic vision of a family or a particular do-
nor. The regulations already require that a community foundation 
have an appropriate name.159 A per se definition should go one 
simple step further and require that the community served be 
identified in the foundation’s organizing documents in terms of a 
particular geographic region.160 By so fixing the foundation pri-
marily to the needs of a particular community, the foundation re-
sembles other per se public charities also devoted, by their physi-
cal presence, to a particular region. 
Some have questioned whether the “community” served by a 
community foundation must be limited to a geographic area,161 or 
whether community could include a more issue-based communi-
ty, e.g., the environmental or human rights “community.”162 A 
meta-physical community, however, should not qualify under 
the per se public charity definition of a community foundation. 
The idea of a per se public charity has always been rooted in 
providing public benefits that relate to an identifiable location, in 
large part because a fixed location creates ongoing, stable relation-
ships that foster oversight and support for a community founda-
tion’s mission. 
In addition, the purpose of community foundations is not just 
to benefit a community but to raise funds for community needs.163 
 
 159. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(iii) (as amended in 2011). 
 160. A community foundation national in scope would not qualify. The geographic 
area served must be appropriate to the population of the area. Community foundations in 
more rural areas naturally would cover larger surface areas than community foundations 
in more urban areas. 
 161. Wendell R. Bird, How to Establish Donor-Advised Funds and Community Founda-
tions, 13 TAX’N EXEMPTS 68, 77 (2001). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(10). 
1.COLINVAUX_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/18  10:35 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
44 
This purpose is the unique reason for community foundations to 
exist as part of a (public charity) philanthropic system. The pur-
pose of community foundations is not to educate students, pro-
vide spiritual nourishment, or heal the sick. But every community 
has needs that, absent government intervention, may go unmet. 
The niche of the community foundation is to address this need.164 
Relatedly, community foundations help keep wealth in the 
community. Without community foundations, local donors in-
clined toward endowment giving would find it harder to endow 
funds for community purposes. Such donors might gravitate to-
ward private foundations or national sponsoring organizations, 
neither of which have the institutional commitment of a commu-
nity foundation to serve a community in perpetuity. 
Further, and by way of contrast, although national sponsoring 
organizations and private foundations both serve important phil-
anthropic ends, neither should qualify for per se public charity 
status. The comparison with community foundations is plain: the 
community served by either vehicle is amorphous. National spon-
soring organizations are national in scope and generally perform 
the function of a conduit—collecting, administering, and then dis-
tributing funds upon donor advice. They have no community-
based mission. Private foundations, unlike national sponsoring 
organizations, are directed more to specific ends and program-
matic agendas. But these need not be focused on any given com-
munity. Moreover, it is the nature of national sponsoring organi-
zations and private foundations to be driven largely by donors 
rather than community preferences. This is not to criticize either 
private foundations or national sponsoring organizations but ra-
ther to recognize that their role in philanthropy is different from 
the community foundation and less inherently public. 
In brief, a strong argument can be made that the purpose of 
community foundations is sufficiently public to warrant per se 
public charity status and that community foundations categorical-
 
 164. Related issues include the extent to which community foundations must, con-
sistent with the goal of raising endowment funds, offer donors a range of options, provide 
advice to donor-advisors, and actively direct distributions to community projects. Each of 
these issues relates less to purpose in the abstract and more to operational concerns and is 
addressed below. 
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ly are different from either national sponsoring organizations or 
private foundations in this regard. A modest step would be to re-
quire, as part of the definition of a community foundation, that 
the community served be geographic and identified in organiza-
tional documents. 
2. Accountability: Responsiveness to the community 
Notwithstanding its strengths, a purpose of serving the needs 
of an identifiable community by raising endowment and unre-
stricted funds likely is insufficient to support an automatic public 
charity classification for community foundations. The abstract 
purpose must become more concrete through operational struc-
tures that will support a legal conclusion of per se public charity 
status. In other words, it must be clear that community founda-
tions are operated for the community, not for donors. 
At this stage, the strength of the theoretical underpinnings of 
the distinction between public charities and private foundations 
becomes relevant. Public charities were excepted from the private 
foundation rules primarily based on the belief that abuses relating 
to control of the charity by insiders were unlikely in the public 
charity form.165 In large part, this belief was rooted in the argu-
ment that, because public charities serve a community, the recip-
rocal relationship would provide effective oversight, and there-
fore additional regulation was not necessary.166 
As noted above, in recent years scandals and policy concerns 
relating to a broad spectrum of public charities have substantially 
undermined this argument.167 Accordingly, if community founda-
tions seek automatic public charity status, the burden will be on 
community foundations to prove the theory—that is, to prove that 
the public charity definition really does help to inoculate the char-
ity from abuse. Community foundations could be pioneers in this 
 
 165. See, e.g., Quarrie v. Comm’r, 603 F.2d 1274, 1277 (7th Cir. 1979) (“Public charities 
were excepted from private foundation status on the theory that their exposure to public 
scrutiny and their dependence on public support would keep them from the abuses to 
which private foundations were subject.”). 
 166. Id.; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 167. Public charities implicated in scandal and controversy have included both chari-
ties automatically classified as public and those considered public based on a public  
support test. 
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respect, establishing improved legal standards for the public  
charity category. 
Further, community foundations may appear to be more vul-
nerable than other public charities to the undue influence of insid-
ers, thereby increasing the burden of proof. This is because ongo-
ing relationships with donors through donor advice are an 
integral part of community foundation operations. Thus, there is 
an almost institutionalized propensity for conflict between pro-
moting the interests of the donor and the interests of the commu-
nity and knowing which is which. 
A starting point for community foundations to establish ac-
countability to the community, by definition, is through rules re-
lating to the composition of the governing board.168 In theory, the 
board should represent the community served and be independ-
ent. Many community foundations likely already meet this goal. 
Nevertheless, without governance rules that attach to per se pub-
lic charity status, community foundations will remain vulnerable 
to the argument that they are governed more for the benefit of 
donors than the community. Strong governance rules could help 
rebut this argument. 
Governance rules could take a variety of forms. A minimum 
requirement of per se public charity status should be that a major-
ity (or supermajority) of community foundation board members 
represents different charitable interests in the community and is 
selected because of members’ knowledge of and experience with 
the community served. Board members should come from the 
principal philanthropic sectors of the community. Requiring wide-
spread representation of the community on the board likely 
would not be a change in current best practice. But in this context, 
codifying best practice is important to reinforce the purpose of 
community foundations as community service organizations. 
Another measure would be to consider term limits for board 
service. A self-perpetuating board can run the risk of becoming 
too entrenched, serving primarily special interests within the 
community or members’ own self-interest. Term limits would 
 
 168. The regulations currently are silent as to board composition. The regulations re-
quire a common governing body and a common governing instrument, but these are inci-
dent to the single entity test. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(iv)–(v)(A). 
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help counter this effect by ensuring regular, new representation 
from the community. Term limits could take the form of two 
terms of service or, more leniently, not more than three consecu-
tive terms. A cap on term length could also be considered, e.g., 
terms of no more than five years. The permutations are several, 
but the main idea is to ensure, by rule, that the foundation 
through board membership remains vibrant and connected to 
evolving community needs. 
In addition, governance rules to prevent undue influence or 
control by insiders or those with vested interests in community 
foundation operations should be weighed. A straightforward re-
quirement would be to provide that substantial contributors, re-
lated parties, and institutional trustees of community foundation 
funds, in the aggregate, do not constitute a board majority (or 
even a lesser percentage). An additional layer of protection would 
require that no single category of insider could constitute more 
than, for example, one-fifth or one-third of the board. 
In short, confidence in the governing board is a critical part of 
a legal conclusion that a community foundation, as a per se public 
charity, is operated for the benefit of the named geographic area 
and not individual donors.  
3. Operational rules 
The abstract purpose of serving the needs of an identifiable 
community as well as governance rules to ensure sound commu-
nity representation are important but not likely to be sufficient for 
a comprehensive public charity community foundation definition. 
Areas of concern remain, rooted in the inherent tensions between 
a grant-making charity and ongoing donor involvement. Even a 
strong public purpose and model governance rules likely will not 
protect against the charge that community foundations accumu-
late funds more for the benefit of donors than the community. 
Apart from issues of donor control, there are separate policy 
questions about income accumulations and the extent to which 
they should be permitted.169 Thus, operational rules directed at 
 
 169. See generally Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 
TAX L. REV. 283 (2011). 
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minimizing donor influence and promoting both an active board 
and a payout should make up the third part of the automatic pub-
lic charity community foundation definition. 
There are several issues to consider and no single answer. Ar-
guably the most important feature of the current legal characteri-
zation of community foundations is the requirement in the regula-
tions that the governing body have the variance power and that it 
be committed to its exercise.170 Without this power, notwithstand-
ing the rules against material restrictions,171 ultimate authority 
over disposition of a gift may remain with the donor. 
Notably, because the Treasury Department required not only 
the fact of the variance power but also a specific commitment to 
its exercise, the expectation was that the variance power should 
and would be used in appropriate circumstances.172 Thus, an im-
portant empirical question for community foundations is the fre-
quency of use of the variance power in such circumstances. Alt-
hough a positive definition of community foundations probably 
cannot do more than require a commitment to use the variance 
power, reporting on the use of the power could be made part of 
the Form 990 for community foundations.173 
Related to the use of the variance power is whether to man-
date a permissible length to advisory privileges of donors. Advi-
sory privileges that survive the death of the donor are a form of 
dead-hand control. By designating an advisor to succeed the don-
 
 170. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(v)(B)(1)–(3), (E)–(F). See supra text accompanying 
notes 66 and 67. 
 171. Treas. Reg. § 1.507-2(a)(8)(iv). The no material restriction rules on donor contri-
butions are critical however and should be retained. They reflect the distinction between 
donor direction and donor advice and generally relate to whether there is a completed gift 
for charitable deduction purposes. Thus, the rules are needed to establish formal legal con-
trol in the foundation. 
 172. However, the regulations also acknowledge that State law might trump variance 
power exercise. Id. § 1.170A-9(f)(11)(v)(D). 
 173. Some sanction short of loss of public charity status could be developed for failure 
to use the power in appropriate circumstances. The regulations hold out loss of public char-
ity status as a consequence for failure to exercise the power, stating: “The governing body 
will be considered not to be so committed [to exercise the power] where it has grounds to 
exercise such a power and fails to exercise it by taking appropriate action.” Id. § 1.170A-
9(f)(11)(v)(E). 
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or, the donor retains a semblance of control over donated funds.174 
Relatedly, skepticism that community foundations have an active 
role in determining the distribution of community funds increases 
the longer the tenure of advice.175 
That said, although a limit on intergenerational advisory privi-
leges helps make the case for the per se public charity status of 
community foundations, alternative (or additional) measures are 
also relevant. The overarching issue is the extent to which the 
community foundation can establish that it actively shapes chari-
table distributions, notwithstanding advisory privileges. 
Again, the contrast with national sponsoring organizations is 
helpful. As intermediaries, NSOs do not purport to add value to 
donor preferences. Community foundations, though, are meant to 
use specialized knowledge of the community to develop plans for 
long-term (and short-term) needs. It should be possible to show 
that donor-advisors are affected in their advice by the direct input 
of the community foundation. This may be hard to measure or 
implement in terms of a legal test, but possibly it could take the 
form of a requirement that donor advice be limited primarily to a 
menu established by the community foundation. This would have 
the effect of clearly limiting most donor-advice to choices estab-
lished or influenced by the community foundation. 
Relatedly, it should be made clear in a definition of communi-
ty foundation that donor-advised funds are not the exclusive ac-
tivity. Community foundations traditionally have offered donors 
a variety of choices: field of interest funds, designated funds, or 
other types of funds that do not require further input of the do-
nor.176 In addition, some community foundations conduct their 
own charitable initiatives. The larger the mix of such funds and 
initiatives within the overall activities of a community foundation, 
the more the identity of the community foundation is reinforced 
as independent of donors. A bright line test may not be desirable 
 
 174. Paradoxically, an intergenerational advisory privilege raises questions of wheth-
er the privilege actually is a right, which potentially could cross the line into donor control. 
Presumably, as a mere privilege, the ability to advise is not subject to the rule against per-
petuities; whereas a property right would be so subject. 
 175. This is a concern that also applies to other DAF-sponsoring organizations. 
 176. Johnson & Jones, supra note 61, at 3.A. (discussing types of funds). 
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in this context (e.g., over fifty percent of assets managed may not 
be in donor-advised funds), but a general requirement that a mix-
ture of funds be offered and used, combined with annual report-
ing, will help to show that a community foundation is more than a 
conduit for donor advice. 
4. Payout 
The question of whether community foundations should be 
subject to a mandatory payout of assets would have to be ad-
dressed in any community foundation definition. A detailed ex-
amination of payout issues is beyond the scope of this Article, but 
an outline of options and a sketch of the main points is important 
to frame the debate. 
Currently, community foundations are not subject to a payout, 
though whether to impose a payout on donor-advised funds, 
without regard to sponsor, is a central issue.177 In the context of 
defining a community foundation, payout should be considered 
both with respect to all investment assets held by the foundation 
(not just those in donor-advised funds) and to whether a distinct 
payout rule on donor-advised funds should apply to the donor-
advised funds of community foundations—taking into account 
the defining characteristics of the community foundation. 
Current law provides for four broadly different approaches to 
payout: no payout, a payout based on perpetual life,178 a payout 
based on the facts and circumstances,179 and a mandatory spend-
down of assets over a short period.180 Historically, the default rule 
is no payout: organizations generally are free to determine 
whether and when to spend assets for the exempt purposes of 
the organization. Mandatory payouts then arise in three broad 
circumstances: in light of the exempt purpose of the organiza-
tion, concerns about accumulations of income by the organiza-
tion, and, relatedly, concerns about donor control of assets. 
 
 177. See Colinvaux, supra note 48; Cullman & Madoff, supra note 9. 
 178. I.R.C. § 4942 (2012) (requiring an annual five percent payout based on invest- 
ment assets). 
 179. Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. 
 180. See infra sources cited in note 188. 
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In considering payout, an important background principle is 
that an organization with the exempt purpose of making grants to 
other charitable organizations has an implicit obligation, as a con-
dition of exempt status, to pay out funds.181 In other words, an or-
ganization that accumulated income and never paid out would 
not be operated for an exempt purpose and should not have ex-
empt status.182 
From this principle, different rules have arisen. Prior to 1969, 
Congress required that organizations with unreasonable accumu-
lations of income lose their exempt status.183 In addition, in the 
1960s, the IRS developed a rule that an organization with the ex-
empt purpose of making grants for charitable purposes must have 
a spending program “commensurate in scope” with the organiza-
tion’s financial resources.184 This rule, known as the commensu-
rate in scope test, was devised to help grant-making organizations 
with unrelated business activity qualify for exempt status, but 
subsequently has been applied to charitable fundraising organiza-
tions as a condition of exempt status.185 
In 1969, the tax on unreasonable accumulations of income was 
replaced with a bright-line payout rule that applies to the investment 
 
 181. Rev. Rul. 67-149, 1967-1 C.B. 133 (holding that an organization “formed for the 
purpose of providing financial assistance to several different types of [501(c)(3)] organiza-
tions” was itself a 501(c)(3) organization and that distributions were required). The ruling is 
derived from a 1924 Supreme Court decision. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 
263 U.S. 578 (1924). 
 182. Regulations require that § 501(c)(3) organizations be operated for an exempt 
purpose. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2016). 
 183. See Williams & Moorehead, supra note 28, at 2102. 
 184. Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. 
 185. For discussion of the commensurate in scope test, see Jack B. Siegel, Commensu-
rate in Scope: Myth, Mystery, or Ghost?—Part One, TAXATION OF EXEMPTS 26 (2008). See also 
Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled Non-
profit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2487 (2005) (noting that the role of the commensurate 
in scope doctrine “appears to be to permit decision makers to approve of charitable status 
for commercial charities that have appealing missions and that spend most of their com-
mercially raised funds on their charitable purposes”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Special 
Emphasis Program—Charitable Fund-Raising, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PRO-
FESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989, at 13 
(1989) (“Whether a fund-raising organization’s activity may be said to accomplish exempt 
purposes often centers on the issue of whether there has been a sufficient turnover of funds 
to charity. This issue is resolved through use of the ‘commensurate test’ . . . .”). 
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assets of private foundations.186 The main reasons for the private 
foundation payout are to protect against unreasonable accumula-
tions and to ensure that private foundations are being used for 
current public benefit.187 
In addition, other approaches to payout exist for certain types 
of public charities. As a condition of public charity (and so not 
private foundation) status, conduit foundations must pay out all 
contributions within two and a half months of the end of the 
foundation’s fiscal year.188 This type of payout is consistent with 
the nature of the organization’s exemption. As a conduit organiza-
tion, there is little reason for the contributions to remain with the 
conduit for any period of time. Similarly, medical research organi-
zations189 and agricultural research organizations must be com-
mitted to spend each contribution for research purposes within 
roughly five years.190 
An issue for community foundations is where they fit on the 
spectrum. In the context of private foundations and the 1969 Act, 
payout was one of several prophylactics against donor control.191 
Because community foundations eventually qualified as publicly 
supported organizations, the payout did not apply to them. Rela-
tive to present law, community foundations that by definition adopt-
ed tightened purpose, governance, and operational restrictions 
 
 186. I.R.C. § 4942 (2012 & Supp. 2017); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 36–37 (1970). 
 187. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, supra note 186. It is out-
side the scope of this paper to discuss whether perpetuity is appropriate or whether the 
payout rate on private foundations should be increased. For additional discussion, see  
Brian Galle, Pay it Forward? Law and the Problem of Restricted-Spending Philanthropy, 93 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1143 (2016). 
 188. I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(vii), 170(b)(1)(F)(ii) (2012 & Supp. 2017); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.170A-9(h) (“Private nonoperating foundation distributing amount equal to all contribu-
tions received . . . .”). Pooled income funds also receive favorable treatment but must pay 
out its net income before 2½ months after the end of its taxable year. Private operating 
foundations also receive favorable treatment but are required to pay out substantially all of 
their income—an easy task given the nature of this type of foundation as operating charita-
ble programs. I.R.C. § 4942 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 189. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(d)(2)(i). 
 190. Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 
§ 331 (2015) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ix)); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-
9(d)(2)(i). 
 191. Troyer, supra note 45. 
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designed to prevent donor control may reasonably demur on 
a payout. 
Furthermore, community foundations already report aggre-
gate payouts in excess of the private foundation five percent 
rate.192 Thus, imposing the private foundation payout could be re-
dundant, if not counterproductive. If, for example, the private 
foundation payout was applied to community foundations, the 
payout could have the paradoxical effect of standardizing a five 
percent rule as the default, resulting in reduced payout rates.193 
The main payout issue for community foundations relates to 
their donor-advised funds. As the author has argued elsewhere, a 
spend-down rule, similar to that which applies to medical and ag-
ricultural research organizations is appropriate for national spon-
soring organizations, in large part because of the nature of the 
NSO’s exemption as a fundraising organization.194 As previously 
argued, however, community foundations, at least in idealized 
form, have a different purpose and serve a different constituen-
cy.195 To the extent the definition of community foundation pro-
posed here reduces material restrictions and enhances the adviso-
ry role played by community foundations with respect to their 
donor funds, community foundations may be able to claim that 
their donor funds are and should be different from donor funds 
housed within national sponsors. 
In the absence of a fund-based payout, however, community 
foundations should at a minimum require mandatory distribu-
tions from inactive funds, with fund terminations (by distribution 
of fund assets to the community foundation general fund) to oc-
cur, for instance, upon a third mandatory distribution. A rule on 
inactive funds need not be so specific, but some rule generally de-
fining an inactive fund, with a clear requirement on distribution 
 
 192. NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, 2016 DONOR-ADVISED FUND REPORT 10 (2016) (report-
ing that for 2015 the payout rate at community foundation donor-advised funds was 15.4%). 
 193. That said, concerns about accumulations at public charities (per se and other-
wise), quite apart from the issue of donor control, suggest that adopting a payout rule as 
part of the community foundation definition should be considered, if only for political ex-
pediency. Adopting the private foundation payout could make sense as a matter of tax ex-
emption, given that community foundations are similar to private foundations in that both 
primarily are grant-making institutions. 
 194. See Colinvaux, supra note 12. 
 195. Supra Section II.C.1. 
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and fund termination, would help address concerns about the lag 
in charitable benefits and donor control and should be part of the 
community foundation definition. Many community foundations 
have adopted inactive fund policies and already require donors to 
make distributions within a certain period of time. 
5. DAF anti-abuse rules 
A final issue is whether a community foundation that is de-
fined as a public charity should remain subject to the PPA DAF 
anti-abuse rules. For purposes of these rules it may make sense 
not to distinguish among sponsoring organizations, thereby re-
taining uniformity. Nonetheless, one of the benefits that would 
come from having a positive definition of a community founda-
tion in the Code is that it would be easier to make exceptions for 
community foundations from broadly applicable rules in appro-
priate circumstances. Accordingly, to the extent a rule is unneces-
sary because of strong community foundation rules on purpose, 
governance, and operations, community foundations can make 
the case for an exception. 
CONCLUSION 
Community foundations have long been a recognized and im-
portant part of the U.S. philanthropic system. Their niche is to 
serve the needs of an identifiable place-based community. But that 
niche is under threat. The success of the nationally sponsored do-
nor-advised funds has compromised the identity of the communi-
ty foundation, pulling it to a more donor-focused, national model. 
This Article has argued that it is time to consider defining the 
community foundation in the Internal Revenue Code as a per se 
public charity. Although community foundations already are con-
sidered public rather than private charities, their public status has 
been obscure and left to Treasury Department regulations. A 
Code-based definition would affirm the public nature of the 
community foundation as an institution on equal terms with other 
key public institutions. A Code-based definition could also vali-
date the community foundation for policymakers and the public, 
leading to a greater understanding of the role community founda-
tions play in community service and thus strengthening the insti-
tution of place-based philanthropy. Importantly, a Code-based 
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definition would provide a basis for distinguishing the communi-
ty foundation from other DAF sponsors for regulatory purposes. 
There is no single best definition of the community founda-
tion. Any definition, however, should take into account historical 
policy concerns about governance, donor control, and income ac-
cumulation. As this Article outlines, a definition should empha-
size the purpose of serving the needs of an identifiable communi-
ty, governance rules that promote an independent board 
comprised of persons who represent the broad charitable interests 
of the community, and operational rules that protect against do-
nor control. 
A strong definition of the community foundation would carve 
a persuasive identity into the Code and help secure the niche of 
the foundation as a vital part of the U.S. philanthropic framework 
for the twenty-first century. 
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